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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 UN Peacekeeping as a Public Good 
Since the Congo crisis of the early 1960s, UN peacekeeping operations have svifFered 
from such problems as poor pre-operational plaxming, slow budgetary process, inefficient 
logistics system axid shortage of well-trained personnel. For decades, these inadequacies 
have undermined the effectiveness of laxge-scale peacekeeping operations. The most seri­
ous problem faced by the United Nations today is, however, the lack of financial support 
from its member states. The expajision of UN peacekeeping activities since the end of 
•: the Cold War hcis increased the severity of this problem, even to the point of jeopar­
dizing the existence of the organization. As the total UN peacekeeping expenditures 
increased from approximately $266 million in 1988 to $3,364 million in 1995, the total 
peacekeeping axreaxs increased from approximately $355.2 million to $1,723.9 million. 
The maintenaxice of world peace could be seen as a public good since it provides 
benefits that are both nonexcludable ajid nonrivaJ. Benefits are nonexcludable if the 
providers are unable to prevent anyone from enjoying them, unless exclusion mechajiisms 
that require prohibitively high outlay are employed. Benefits of a good axe said to be 
nonrival if the enjoyment of the benefits gained from a good by an individual does not 
reduce ajiother individual's enjoyment of the benefits gained from the same unit of the 
good (Cornes and Sandler 1996). For the purpose of maintaining international peace 
and security, UN peacekeeping is likely to create purely public benefits. For example, 
the benefits provided by UN Emergency Force II (1973-79), which averted a direct 
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superpower confrontation in the Middle East, were enjoyed by nations and their citizens 
all over the world, regardless of who financed the operation or how many nations received 
the benefits from it. Nonexcludability of benefits creates a problem of free riding, or 
more precisely, easy riding. Each country's reliance on the contributions of others, and 
its failure to taJce into account the spillover benefits its contribution confers on others 
will result in the underprovision, or suboptimality of total peacekeeping efforts. 
As opposed to public benefits, contributor-specific benefits axe received by a country 
only from its own contribution. For example, a covintry can be recognized by the interna­
tional community as a promoter of world peace, when it generously supports peacekeep­
ing or humanitarian aid (e.g., Norway). Because it is recognized by other nations as one 
of the laxgest beneficiaries of Middle East stability, Japan receives contributor-specific 
benefits in the form of international approval when it supports peacekeeping operations 
in the region, and it would suffer international disapproval if it decides not to contribute 
its support. 
If it is assumed that peacekeeping efforts produce only purely public benefits, and 
that each country's demand for peacekeeping is positively correlated with its national 
income, the pure public good model of collective action predicts that wealthy member 
states assume disproportionate burden in terms of the percentage of income contributed 
(Olson and Zeckhauser 1966; Sandler and Hartley 1995). This would not be the case 
if peacekeeping efforts produce not only public benefits, but also contributor-specific 
benefits. The joint product model, in which an activitiy (e.g. peacekeeping) is allowed 
to produce multiple benefits with varying degrees of publicness, includes both pure public 
good model and pure private good model as two extremes. As the ratio of contributor-
specific benefits to the simi of public benefits and contributor-specific benefits increases, 
that is, as the share of private benefits produced by peacekeeping increases, the total 
level of peacekeeping efforts approaches optimality. This follows because private goods 
can be efl5.ciently traded across markets as traders reveal their true preferences. In this 
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case, disproportionate burden sharing by wealthy member states would not resxilt. 
As aji attempt to siirvey the chajige in suboptimality of UN peacekeeping efforts. 
Chapter 2 of this dissertation examines the finaiicial burden-shaxing patterns of selected 
UN member states for the period of 1975-96. Using non-parametric statistical tests, this 
chapter studies the rank correlation between gross domestic product (GDP) and share 
of GDP devoted to UN peacekeeping for four different subsets of UN member states. 
Since the early 1990s, there have been several large-scale non-UN-led peace opera­
tions, such as Operation Desert Shield/Storm during the Gulf War, NATO-led multi­
national Implementation Force (IFOR), and Stabilization Force (SFOR) in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. In order to gain a more accurate picture of peacekeeping burden shared 
by coimtries in the 1990s, the burden sharing of these non-UN-led operations are also 
studied in Chapter 2. 
In Chapter 3, a reduced-form UN peacekeeping contribution function is derived using 
a joint-product model, in which peacekeeping efforts are cissumed to produce contributor-
specific benefits as well as purely public benefits. In this model, a representative coun­
try's utility depends on the level of nation-specific non-peacekeeping activities, the level 
of its contribution to UN peacekeeping, and the level of total peacekeeping contribution 
received by the United Nations. The country allocates its resources between peacekeep­
ing contribution and non-peacekeeping activities in order to maximizes its utility. To 
ascertain what determines the contribution level of each member state, the contribution 
functions are estimated for a sample of 25 UN member states for the period of 1975-
96. The variables on which each country's contribution function depends include other 
countries' contributions, or spillin. Consequently, each covmtry's contribution is tied 
to contribution decision of other contributing countries, so that the disturbance term 
is correlated among the contributors' equations. That is, the presence of spiUin in the 
contribution function makes the error terms dependent on one another. The two-stage 
least square method is used to get rid of this simultaneity problem. 
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Virtually every UN peacekeeping operation established in and after 1973 is/was fi­
nanced through separate assessment account.^ AU UN member states are required to 
contribute assessed amotmts towards each accoimt. Possible effects of this peacekeep­
ing special assessments on cotintries' financial contributions are discussed in Chapter 
4. It is argued that, even without effective sanctions against undercontribution, the 
existence of assessments increases a country's contribution by increasing its contributor-
specific benefits. Incorporating this assessment effect into a utility function will shift 
up the coimtry's downward sloping contribution curve for each operation as long as the 
contribution does not exceed the assessment. 
Although peacekeeping operations create benefits which are both globally nonex­
cludable and nonrival, the valuation of the benefits often varies across countries. For 
example, consider operations in the Middle East. The countries in the region as well as 
oil-dependent industrialized countries are likely to place more value on such operations 
than oil-exporting countries in the other regions. A country's valuation of public bene­
fits created by a peacekeeping operation depends on, among other things, proximity, the 
amoxmt of trade done with the region, and the nature of the conflict, such as the possi­
bility of the conflict leading to a direct military confrontation of the superpowers (during 
the Cold War), or potential involvement of nuclear weapons.^ The UN peacekeeping as­
sessment scale is, however, based solely on the ability to pay of each member state, and 
not on its valuation of benefits received. A theoretical possibility of increasing the total 
contribution of each coimtry by redistributing its assessments across operations accord­
ing to the value placed on each operation by the country is also discussed in Chapter 
4. 
The following three sections in this chapter are intended to be an introduction to the 
'^The UN Good OflBces Mission in Afgiieinistan and Pakistein (TJNGOMAP) established in 1988 was 
financed through the UN regulax budget. 
^Bobrow and Boyer (1997) discuss the difference in the benefits of a peacekeeping operation received 
by the countries within and outside the conflict area. 
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bcLsic structures of UN peacekeeping. They discuss the UN organs involved in peace­
keeping, the main chaxacteristics of various types of peacekeeping operations, the 50-year 
history of UN peacekeeping, and the financing methods used by the United Nations for 
its peacekeeping operations. 
1.2 Establishment of UN Peacekeeping Operations 
The United Nations is composed of six principle organs: the General Assembly, the 
Security Council, the International Court of Justice, the Economic and Social Council, 
the Trusteeship Council, and the Secretariat headed by the Secretary General. Of these, 
the Security Coimcil, the Secretariat, and the General Assembly axe involved in the 
process of establishing and conducting UN peacekeeping operations. 
1.2.1 The Security Council 
As a first step toward the establishment of a new UN peacekeeping operation, a pro­
posal by the Secretary General or UN member states is referred to the Security Council, 
which consists of 15 members, for its preliminary approval. The approval requires a 
majority of nine votes, including the concurring votes of the five permanent members. 
The permanent members include China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the 
United States. Ten non-permanent members with a two-year term are recommended by 
the General Assembly, and selected by the Security Council based on their geographical 
representation. The Security Council is the UN organ which bears the primary respon­
sibility for the maintenance of international peace and security; Chapter VI of the UN 
Charter stipulates that the Security Council may seek pacific settlement of disputes, 
while Chapter VII authorizes the Security Council to take military action if necessary. 
It is mandatory for the UN member states to abide by the Security Council resolutions. 
The Secvurity Council is the only UN organ with such a power. 
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1.2.2 The Secretariat and Secretary General 
Once the Security Council authorizes establishment of a peacekeeping operation, the 
Secretariat, headed by the Secretary General, lays a detailed mission plan, and prepares 
a budget. The Secretary General and Secretariat personnel axe so-called international 
civil servants, and may not directly work for the interests of any particular government. 
In 1992, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations was created in the Secretariat in 
order to improve its efficiency. 
Under the UN Charter, Article 99, "the Secretary General may bring to the attention 
of the Security Council any matter which in his opinion may threaten the maintenance 
of international peace and security." With this privilege, the Secretary General has tra­
ditionally imdertaken political and diplomatic initiatives on numerous occasions. Also, 
during the Cold War, the Secretary General ha^ acted as intermediary when the perma­
nent members of the Security Coimcil were divided on issues and were not able to adopt 
resolutions (Hill and Malik 1996). 
1.2.3 The General Assembly 
The Secretariat submits the peacekeeping operation budget to the Advisory Com­
mittee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ), the budget review unit 
of the General Assembly's Fifth Committee, for approval. The ACABQ recommends 
the budget to the Fifth Committee, which includes all UN member states. The Fifth 
Committee is one of the six General Assembly committees, and deals with administra­
tive and budgetary matters. Finally, the Fifth Committee submits the budget to the 
General Assembly for consensus approval. 
Dxiring the Korean War, the use of veto by the Soviet Union brought the Security 
Council to deadlock. In order to ensure the continuation of the UN-sanctioned peace 
enforcement operation in Korea, in 1950, the General Assembly adopted the Uniting for 
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Peace Resolution. This resolution authorizes the General Assembly to make recommen­
dations to member states for collective sectirity measures when the Security Council fails 
to act because of lack of imanimity among its permanent members. 
1.3 Four Types of Peace Operations 
There axe a variety of ways of categorizing UN peacekeeping operations.^ Durch 
(1996) suggests that operations be classified into four types: traditional peacekeeping 
operations, multidimensional peace operations, humanitarian interventions, and peace 
enforcement. 
1.3.1 TraditionEd Peacekeeping Operations 
Traditional peacekeeping operations involve deployment of impaxtial military person­
nel who monitor a cease-fire, investigate minor disputes, and attempt to defuse tensions 
between former belligerents. These operations axe set up with the consent of parties 
involved in the conflict, and only if they agree on a cease-fire. The peacekeepers axe 
equipped with light axmaments, and axe allowed to use their force only in self-defense. 
Once the host nation consent is lost, or the cease-fire is broken, the peacekeepers are 
withdrawn. 
1.3.2 Multidimensional Peace Operations 
Multidimensional peace operations are fax more complicated than traditional peace­
keeping, and involve assisting a nation with political transition toward democracy. The 
operation requires civilian personnel as well as military, for tasks such as maintenance 
^For example, Diehl et al. (1998) classify peacekeeping operations in the following 12 categories: tra­
ditional pecicekeeping, observation, collective enforcement, election supervision, humanitarian assistance 
during conflict, state/nation building, pacification, preventive deployment, arms control verification, 
protective services (e.g., safe heavens, no-fly zones), intervention in support of democracy, sanctions 
enforcement. 
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of law and order, repatriation and resettlement of refugees and displaced persons, the 
reorganization of domestic militaxy forces, ajid the conduct of general election (UN De­
partment of Public Information 1996). 
1.3.3 HumEinitEirian Interventions 
Himianitaxian interventions are operations whose main purpose includes delivering 
of food and medical supplies to non-combatants suffering ia military conflict areas. The 
intervention often requires use of limited amount of force as local parties involved in the 
conflict try to prevent humanitarian aid from reaching their enemies. 
1.3.4 Peace Enforcement Operations 
In peace enforcement operations, military forces are deployed in order to create a 
cease-fire between belligerents. Three characteristics seen in traditional peacekeeping 
operations, namely, impartiality of militaxy personnel, host nation consent, and use of 
force only in self-defense, are all absent in such operations, aaad as a consequence, the risk 
of suffering heavy casualties is relatively high. Commonly, peace enforcement operations 
ajre sanctioned by the United Nations, but led by a member state or a group of member 
states such as NATO, and not by the United Nations. 
1.4 History of UN Peacekeeping 
1.4.1 The Cold War Period 
Fourteen UN peacekeeping operations were established during the Cold War, and 
twelve of which are/were traditional peacekeeping involving monitoring cease-fires or 
acting as buffers between belligerents. The very first operation in which the United Na­
tions used impartial military observers was the UN Special Committee on the Balkans 
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(UNSCOB: 1947-52)."^ UNSCOB was set up to investigate militaxy support of Greek 
communist guerrillcis by Albania, Bulgaria ajid Yugoslavia, Deadlock in the Secxirity 
CoTmcil, created by the Soviet Union's use of the veto, led the General Assembly to 
authorize the establishment of UNSCOB. The next two operations, the UN Truce Su­
pervision Organization (UNTSO: 1948 to date) and the UN Militaxy Observer Group 
in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP: 1949 to date), have aJl the main characteristics 
of traditional peacekeeping. They axe classic observer missions. UNTSO military ob­
servers have monitored cease-fires between Israel and its neighboring coxmtries, while 
UNMOGIP was established after a cease-fire agreement between India and PaJdstan. 
The UN Emergency Force I (UNEF I: 1956-67) was established to supervise with­
drawal of French, Israeli and British troops from Egypt, and then to create a buffer 
between the Egyptian and Israeli forces. The purpose of UNEF I was to secure, rather 
thaji just to monitor, the cease-fire (HiU and Malik: 1996). At its pealc strength, UNEF 
I consisted of 6,073 military personnel, while UNTSO and UNMOGIP consisted of 572 
and 102 military observers, respectively. Creation of UNEF I was authorized by the 
General Assembly through the application of the Uniting for Peace Resolution; the Se­
curity Coimcil found itself deadlocked as the two of its permanent members, France and 
the United Kingdom, were directly involved in the conflict. UNEF I successfully oversaw 
the withdrawal of foreign forces from Egypt, and monitored a cease-fire until 1967. 
Established to supervise the withdrawal of Belgian forces from the Congo, and to 
assist the Congolese government to restore law and order, the UN Operation in the 
Congo (ONUC: 1960-64) was initially designed to follow the key principles of tradi­
tional peacekeeping. As the civil war in the Congo intensified, however, its mandate 
was strengthened, ajid ONUC became a peace enforcement operation. The number of 
military personnel reached 19,828 in 1961, and by the end of mission, the UN lost a total 
'^Impartial militeiry personnel of UNSCOB were never allowed by either Albania or Yugoslavia on 
their territory. This lack of consent by some of the countries involved in the dispute led some to argue 
that UNSCOB did not qualify as a peacekeeping operation. 
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of 250 personnel, including the Secretary General Dag Hammarskjold. 
Between 1962 and 1965, the United Nations established five new traditional peace­
keeping operations: two large-scale operations and three small-scale observer missions. 
Small-scale operations were the UN Yemen Observation Mission (UNYOM: 1963-64), 
the Mission of the Representative of the Secretary General in the Dominican Repub­
lic (DOMREP: 1965-66) and the UN India-PaMstan Observation Mission (UNIPOM: 
1965-66). Laxge-scale operations axe/were the UN Security Force in West New Guinea 
(UNSF: 1962-63) and the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP: 1964 to date). 
UNSF with maximum strength of 1,576 military personnel monitored a cease-fire be­
tween Indonesia and the Netherlands in the territory under the UN Temporary Exec­
utive Authority (UNTEA: 1962-63). It successfully maintained security imtil the full 
administrative authority wa^ transferred to Indonesia in 1963. UNFICYP was initially 
established to prevent a recurrence of inter-communal violence between the Greek Cypri-
ots and Turkish Cypriots. Since the Turkish invasion of Cyprus in 1974, its mandate 
has also included the maintenance of a buffer zone between the areas controlled by the 
Cyprus National Guard and by Turkish Forces. 
During 1973-87, the United Nations launched only three new peacekeeping opera­
tions, all of which axe/were in the Middle East. Following the 1973 Middle East War, 
the UN Emergency Force II (UNEF II: 1973-79) re-established a buffer zone between 
Egypt and Israel, and averted a military confrontation between the United States and 
the Soviet Union. After an Agreement on Disengagement between Israeli and Syrian 
forces on the Golan Heights in 1974, the UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF: 
1974 to date) was established to supervise the implementation of the agreement. The 
UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL: 1978 to date) has been set up to confirm the 
withdrawal of Israeli forces from southern Lebanon. Without full cooperation of Is­
rael, however, UNIFIL has been unsuccessful in fulfilling its original purpose, showing a 
limitation of traditional peacekeeping. 
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To suramaxize, following a successful, first ever large-scale peacekeeping operation, 
UNEF I, the United Nations undertook even larger ONUC, which turned out to be 
one of the most costly operations in terras of finances and lives. After ONUC, five new 
operations were established in the 1960s. Four of them were short-term operations, com­
pleted in less than two years. All of the operations set up in the 1970s were established 
with the initiatives of the United States. After these three Middle East operations, the 
United Nations did not authorize any new operations for ten years, until 1988. 
1.4.2 The Post-Cold War Period 
Starting with the UN Good Ofl&ces Mission in Afghanistan and PaJcistan (UN-
GOMAP: 1988-90), which monitored the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, 
the United Nations engaged in ten new operations by the end of 1991.^ Not only the 
number, but also the complexity of operations were to increase during this period: six 
of these operations were multidimensional, rather than traditional peacekeeping. 
The first multidimensional peace operation, the UN Transitional Assistance Group 
(UNTAG: 1989-90), supervised the independence of Namibia through free and fair elec­
tions. At its peak strength, UNTAG consisted of 4,493 military personnel, 1,500 po­
lice and 2,000 civilians. The tasks of military personnel included confinement of South 
African troops in Namibia and South African People's Organization (SWAPO) troops in 
Angola and Zambia to base, and supervision of subsequent withdrawal of South African 
troops from Namibia. The UN civilian police (CIVPOL) monitored the South West 
African Police (SWAPOL), and the civilian personnel monitored elections. 
An even larger multidimensional peace operation was the UN Transitional Authority 
in Cambodia (UNTAC: 1992—93), which inamediately followed the UN Advanced Mission 
in Cambodia (UNAMIC: 1991-92). At its peak strength, 15,991 military personnel 
®Not every post-Cold War operations are discussed in this section. For a complete list of operations, 
see Table 1.1. 
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and 3,359 civilian police were deployed in order to ensnre the implementation of the 
Agreements on the Comprehensive PoUtical Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict, edso 
known as the Paris Peace Accords signed in October 1991. The supervision of withdrawal 
of foreign troops, the demobilization of the four Cainbodiaji factions' militaxy forces, 
the maintenance of law and order, the protection of hnma,n rights, the repatriation and 
resettlement of the Cambodiaji refugees and displaced persons, the rehabilitation of 
essential infrastructure, and the conduct of free and fair general elections were included 
in the UNTAC's mandate. 
Besides UNTAC, the peacekeeping operations established in 1992 included the UN 
Protection Force (UNPROFOR: 1992-95), the UN Operation in Somalia I (UNOSOM 
I: 1992-93), and the UN Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ: 1992-94). Initially UN-
PROFOR's task was to ensure the demilitaxization of the three UN Protected Areas 
(UNPAs) in Croatia. It's mandate was soon extended to include monitoring of areas 
around UNPAs, so-called pink zones, protection of the Sarajevo Airport and support 
of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) on its delivery of humanitarian 
relief throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina. UNPROFOR also monitored the no-fly zone 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the UN safe areas established around five Bosnian towns 
and the city of Sarajevo. Without cooperation of parties directly involved in the conflict, 
the Security Coimcil authorized the UN member states to take peace enforcement mea­
sures nationally or through regional arrangements if necessary to support UNPROFOR. 
NATO has played a large role during the conflict; its forces monitored and enforced the 
no-fly zone as well as the UN arms embargo and sanctions, and protected the UN safe 
areas. UNPROFOR was also deployed in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 
(FYROM) in 1993 to prevent the conflict from spreading into the territory. This was the 
first time the United Nations deployed its forces before any military clash had occurred, 
and it is called preventive deployment, or a tripwire force. Its purpose is to symbolize 
the international commimity's wiU to act against aggression (Durch 1996). It is likely 
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that the inclusion of US troops has contributed to the effectiveness of the force in the 
FYROM. At its peaJc strength, UNPROFOR consisted of 38,614 troops, 637 military-
observers and 671 civilian police. In 1995, UNPROFOR was sepajated into three opera­
tions: UNPROFOR in Bosnia and Herzegovina (1995), the UN Confidence Restoration 
Operation in Croatia (UNCRO: 1995-96), the UN Preventive Deployment Force in FY­
ROM (UNPREDEP: 1995-99). After the signing of the Bosnia Peace Agreement in 
December 1995, the NATO-led 60,000 troop-strong multinational Implementation Force 
(IFOR: December 1995-96) took over from UNPROFOR in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
IFOR was followed by the NATO Stabilization Force (SFOR: December 1996 to date) 
with approximately 31,000 troops. 
UNOSOM I's mandate included monitoring of a cease-fire in Mogadishu, the capital 
of Somalia, and protection of humanitaxian convoys and distribution centers throughout 
Somalia. As in the case of operations in the former Yugoslavia, the United Nations 
did not have the support of the Somali factions involved in the civil war. In December 
1992, the US-led peace enforcement operation, the Unified Task Force (UNITAF: 1992— 
93) with approximately 37,000 troops was established to support UNOSOM I. In May 
1993, UN-led peace enforcement operation, UNOSOM II took over from UNOSOM I 
and UNITAF. In October, the US Rangers under US command conducted a raid in 
South Mogadishu with the intention of capturing key aides of General Aidid who were 
suspected of complicity in attacks on UN personnel and facilities. During the raid, 18 US 
soldiers were killed and 75 others were wounded. Losing support of both participating 
member states and Somali poptdation, UNOSOM II withdrew in March 1995 without 
accomplishing its ultimate goai of organizing democratic elections and establishing a 
national government. At its peaJc strength, UNOSOM II consisted of approximately 
28,000 military and police personnel. 
Operations in the former Yugoslavia and Somalia demonstrated the difficulties and 
complexity of operations conducted without local consent. In such a case, humanitarian 
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interventions by the United Nations require peace enforcement operations, for which 
the United Nations often must rely on coalitions of its member states. As Garment 
and James (1998a) point out, "UN involvement may increase complexity and exacer­
bate tensions that caimot be managed, let alone resolved, through an underfimded and 
underequipped third paxty." A total of 207 UNPROFOR personnel axid 147 UNOSOM 
II persormel were killed during the operations. 
Another example of peace enforcement operation was the US-led multinational force 
(MNF: 1994-95) in Haiti, which prompted the departmre of the Haitian coup leaders and 
the return of President Aristide. The UN Mission in Haiti (UNMIH: 1993-96) was fully 
deployed in March 1995, taJdng over from MNF. UNMIH (maximum strength: 6,065 
troops ajad military support personnel, 847 civilian police) assisted the Haitian govern­
ment in the professionalization of its military forces, the creation of a separate police 
force and the organization of legislative elections. Three smaller scale missions, namely, 
the UN Support Mission in Haiti (UNSMIH: 1996-97), the UN Transition Mission in 
Haiti (UNTMIH: 1997) and the UN Civilian Police Mission in Haiti (MIPONUH: 1997 
to date) followed UNMIH. 
Following the failure of UNOSOM II, the member states' unwillingness to commit 
themselves to a non-traditional peacekeeping operation with possibilities of suffering 
heavy casualties was demonstrated most clearly during the UN Assistance Mission for 
Rwanda (UNAMIR: 1993-96). Originally UNAMIR was established to support the im­
plementation of the Arusha Peace Agreement between the Hutu-dominated Rwandan 
government and the Tutsi-dominated Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF). The agreement 
was never fuUy implemented however, as the fight between the RPF and the govern­
ment force resumed in April 1994 after the Hutu extremists started killing its political 
opponents and a large number of Tutsi civilians. The UN member states were extremely 
reluctant to contribute their troops upon the Secretary General's requests, allowing the 
massacre of 500,000 to 800,000 civilians as a result. (Garment and James 1998b) 
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Table 1.1 UN-led peacekeeping operations: 1947-99 
Operation Location Duration 
UNSCOB 
UN Special Committee on the 
Balkans 
Greece 1947-52 
UNTSO 
UN Truce Supervision Organization Middle East 1948 to date 
UNMOGIP 
UN Militaxy Observer Group in In­
dia and PaJdstan 
State of Jammu and Kash­
mir 
1949 to date 
UNEF I 
UN Emergency Force I Sinai Peninsula 1956-67 
UNOGIL 
UN Observation Group in Lebanon Lebanon 1958 
ONUC 
UN Operation in Congo Zaire 1960-64 
UNSF/UNTEA 
UN Security Force in West New 
Guinea (West Irian)/UN Tempo­
rary Executive Authority 
West Irian 1962-63 
UNYOM 
UN Yemen Observation Mission Border between Yemen and 
Saudi Arabia 
1963-64 
UNFICYP 
UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus Cyprus 1964 to date 
DOMREP 
Mission of the Representative of the 
Secretary General in the Dominicaji 
Republic 
Dominican Republic 1965-66 
UNIPOM 
UN India-Pakistan Observation 
Mission 
India and Pakistan 1965-66 
UNEF II 
UN Emergency Force II Sinai Peninsula 1973-79 
UNDOF 
UN Disengagement Observer Force Golan Heights 1974 to date 
UNIFIL 
UN Interim Force in Lebanon Southern Lebanon 1978 to date | 
SOURCE: United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Internet site, 
http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/. 
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Table 1.1 (Continued) 
Operation Location Duration 
UNGOMAP 
UN Good Offices Mission in 
Afghanistaji and PaJdstan 
Afghanistan and Pakistan 1988-90 
UNIIMOG 
UN Iran-Iraq Military Observer 
Group 
Border between Iran and 
Iraq 
1988-91 
UNAVEM I 
UN Angola Verification Mission I Angola 1989-91 
UNTAG 
UN Transition Assistance Group in 
Namibia 
Namibia 1989-90 
ONUCA 
UN Observer Group in Central 
America 
Costa Rica, El Salvador, 
Guatemala, Honduras and 
Nicaragua 
1989-92 
UNIKOM 
UN Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mis­
sion 
Border between Iraq and 
Kuwait 
1991 to date 
UNAVEM II 
UN Angola Verification Mission II Angola 1991-95 
ONUSAL 
UN Observer Mission in El Salvador El Salvador 1991-95 
MINURSO 
UN Mission for the Referendum in 
Western Sahara 
Western Sahaxa 1991 to date 
UNAMIC 
UN Advance Mission in Cambodia Cambodia 1991-92 
UNPROFOR 
UN Protection Force Former Yugoslavia 1992-95 
UNTAC 
UN Transitional Authority in Cam­
bodia 
Cambodia 1992-93 
UNOSOM 
UN Operation in Somalia Somalia 1992-93 
ONUMOZ 
UN Operation in Mozambique Mozambique 1992-94 
UNOSOM II 
UN Operation in Somalia II Somalia 1993-95 
UNOMUR 
UN Observer Mission Uganda-
Rwanda 
Border between Uganda and 
Rwanda 
1993-94 
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Table 1.1 (Continued) 
UNOMIG 
UN Observer Mission in Georgia Georgia and Abkhazia 1993 to date 
UNOMIL 
UN Observer Mission in Liberia Liberia 1993-97 
UNMIH 
UN Mission in Haiti Haiti 1993-96 
UNAMIR 
UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda Rwanda 1993-96 
UNASOG 
UN Aouzou Strip Observer Group Aouzou Strip 1994 
UNMOT 
UN Mission of Observers in Tajik-
istcin 
Tajikistan 1994 to date 
UNAVEM in 
UN Angola Verification Mission HI Angola 1995-97 
UNCRO 
UN Confidence Restoration Opera­
tion in Croatia 
Croatia 1995-96 
UNPREDEP 
UN Preventive Deployment Force Macedonia 1995-99 
UNMIBH 
UN Mission in Bosnia and Herze­
govina 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 1995 to date 
UNTAES 
UN Transitional Administration for 
Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and 
Western Sinnium 
Croatia 1996-98 
UNMOP 
UN Mission of Observers in Pre-
vlaJca 
Prevlalca Peninsula (Croa­
tia) 
1996 to date 
UNSMIH 
UN Support Mission in Haiti Haiti 1996-97 
MINUGUA 
UN Verification Mission in 
Guatemala 
Guatemala 1997 
MONUA 
UN Observer Mission in Angola Angola 1997-99 
UNTMIH 
UN Transition Mission in Haiti Haiti 1997 
MIPONUH 
UN Civilian Police Mission in Haiti Haiti 1997 to date 
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Table I.l (Continued) 
UNPSG 
UN Police Support Group Croatia 1998 
MINURCA 
UN Mission in the Central African 
Republic 
The Central African Repub­
lic 
1998 to date 
UNOMSIL 
UN Mission of Observers in Sierra 
Leone 
Sierra Leone 1998 to date 
1.5 Financing of UN Peacekeeping 
1.5.1 UN Regular Budget 
Six of the peacekeeping operations established during the period of 1947-65, namely, 
UNSCOB, UNTSO, UNMOGIP, UNOGIL, DOMREP and UNIPOM, as well as UN­
GOMAP established in 1988 axe/were financed through the UN regular budget. UN-
TEA/UNSF and UNYOM were financed by the countries most directly involved, while 
UNFICYP had been financed solely by voluntary contributions until 1992. The cissess-
ment scale for the UN regular budget is based on ability to pay, or income, of each 
member state. The United Nations uses a ten-year average of Gross Domestic Product 
with adjustments which make the scale progressive with respect to per capita income (e.g. 
low-per-capita-income allowajice).® A ceiling, or maximum assessment shaxe (currently 
25 percent) ha^ been applied to the United States. A floor, or minimum assessment 
shaxe (currently 0.01 percent) has been applied to about half of the member states since 
the late 1960s. 
1.5.2 Specicd Assessments 
In 1973, the General Assembly adopted a resolution which set up a special assess­
ment account for financing of UNEF II, and except for UNGOMAP, this has been the 
®See Officer (1996) for details. 
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financing method used for ail the foUowing UN-sanctioned and UN-led peacekeeping 
operations." For this assessment purpose, the UN member states axe divided into four 
groups: Group A, the five permanent members of the Security Council; Group B, other 
developed countries; Group C, wealthy developing countries; and Group D, other devel­
oping countries. Group A countries pay about 22 percent more than their UN regular 
budget contribution shaxe (Durch 1993). Group B countries pay the sajne shaxe as their 
contributions to the regular budget. Group C countries pay 20 percent of their regu­
lar budget contribution share, and Group D countries pay 10 percent of their regular 
budget contribution shaxe. With this finaxicing method, approximately 97 percent of 
peacekeeping costs axe assigned to less than 30 countries which belong to Group A ajid 
Group B. For each operation finaxiced through its own special assessment account, mem­
ber states receive sepaxate assessment letters from the General Assembly. Non-UN-led 
peace enforcement operations (e.g., UNITAF in Somalia, the NATO-led operations in 
the former Yugoslavia), as well as Operation Desert Shield/Storm during the Gulf Wax 
were financed by the paxticipating member states, and not through special cissessment 
accounts. 
1.5.3 UN Peacekeeping Expenditures 
Table 1.2 shows the UN peacekeeping expenditures dxiring the period of 1947-97. 
The expenditiires stayed imder $10 millions imtil 1956. As the United Nations estab­
lished UNEF I in 1956, and ONUC in 1960, the expenditures increased from S9 millions 
in 1956 to $127 millions in 1963. As ONUC ended in 1964, and UNEF I in 1967, the 
expenditmres decreased, ajid stayed at approximately $24 millions during 1968-72. They 
started increasing again in the eaxly 1970s as the United Nations established UNEF 11 
in 1973, UNDOF in 1974, and UNIFIL in 1978. UNEF II ended in 1979. UNDOF and 
^Before UNEF II, UNEF I aind ONUC were also financed through special assessments, the appor­
tionment rules of which were different from the one developed for UNEF II. See Mills (1990) for details. 
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Table 1.2 UN peacekeeping expenditures: 
1947-97 
(in millions of US dollars) 
The Cold Weir period The post-Cold War period 
Year Expenditures Year Expenditures 
1947 0 1988 266 
1948 4 1989 635 
1949 7 1990 464 
1950 7 1991 490 
1951 6 1992 1,767 
1952 6 1993 3,059 
1953 6 1994 3,342 
1954 6 1995 3,364 
1955 6 1996 1,840 
1956 9 1997 1,300 
1957 26 
1958 30 
1959 26 
1960 76 
1961 126 
1962 126 
1963 127 
1964 91 
1965 45 
1966 45 
1967 37 
1968 24 
1969 24 
1970 24 
1971 24 
1972 24 
1973 37 
1974 131 
1975 153 
1976 153 
1977 153 
1978 202 
1979 186 
1980 141 
1981 141 
1982 141 
1983 141 
1984 141 
1985 141 
1986 242 
1987 240 
SOURCE; Global Policy Forum, Internet site, 
http://www .globalpolicy.org. 
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UNIFIL still continue as of 1999. 
With the end of the Cold Wax, ten new operations were established during the 
period of 1988-91. The peacekeeping expenditures increased from S266 millions in 1988 
to $635 millions in 1989, decreased to $464 millions in 1990, and increased again to §490 
millions in 1991. Four new operations, including the three most expensive operations in 
UN history (UNPROFOR, UNTAC and UNOSOM) were established in 1992, increasing 
the peacekeeping expenditures to $1,767 millions. The expenditvires increased further to 
$3,364 millions in 1995, and then decreased to $1,840 millions in 1996, as UNPROFOR 
ajid UNOSOM II ended in 1995. As indicated during UNAMIR, the member states 
have become very reluctant to support new laxge-scale operations in the second half of 
the 1990s, keeping the UN peacekeeping expenditures well below the 1993-95 level as a 
result. This trend is expected to continue in the near futiire. 
1.5.4 Troop Contributions 
While soldiers participating in UN-led peacekeeping operations receive salaries from 
their own governments according to their national military rajik, member states con­
tributing these soldiers are compensated by the United Nations currently at a flat rate 
of approximately $1,000 per month for each soldier, regardless of rank. Actual per-
person costs, however, vaxy widely across troop contributing countries, from as little as 
$280 up to $4,400 per month (Durch 1993). Therefore the current reimbursement scheme 
gives less developed countries a strong financial incentive to contribute their troops. The 
United Nations can reimburse troop contributors only after it receives sufficient finan­
cial contributions from its member states. Wealthier countries tend to be the last to get 
reimbursed, giving them even less incentive to contribute their expensive troops.® 
®Bobrow ouid Boyer (1997) analyze troop contribution patterns of UN member states in recent years. 
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1.6 Concluding Remarks 
Limited by the discord among the permanent members of the Security Council, only 
14 peacekeeping operations were established by the United Nations during the Cold Wax 
period. Majority of such operations are/were traditional peacekeeping which require 
pre-established cease-fire. 
With the end of the Cold War, the United Nations emerged as a major player for 
the world peace, establishing the next fourteen operations within five years (1988-92). 
Unlike the operations during the Cold Wax period, many of these early post-Cold Wax 
operations are categorized as multidimensional operations, humanitarian interventions, 
axid/or peace enforcement operations. The renewed hope for the United Nations dis-
appeaxed quickly, however, as some of these ambitious operations ended with failure or 
with only small success, revealing the limitation of UN peacekeeping. 
Although the number and complexity of UN peacekeeping operations increased dra­
matically in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the financing methods used by the United 
Nations remained unchanged; the orgaxuzation continues to rely on the contributions 
from its member states. Compared to the tax systems used by national, state, and local 
governments to finaxice public goods, the assessment system used by the United Nations 
is more prone to the problem of suboptimality of contributions. When UN peacekeep­
ing creates globally public benefits, which is nonexcludable by definition, each member 
state's reliance on the contributions of others, and its failure to take into account the 
spillover benefits its contribution confers on others will result in the underprovision of 
total peacekeeping efforts. This collective action problem associated with UN peace­
keeping is the topic of the following three chapters of this dissertation. 
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CHAPTER 2 SHARING THE FINANCIAL BURDEN FOR 
UN PEACEKEEPING 
2.1 Olson's Exploitation Hypothesis 
In his book, the Logic of Collective Action (1965), Olson argues that, in a small 
group composed of heterogeneous members, a member who places the highest value to 
a pure public good tends to bear a disproportionate shaxe of the burden of providing 
the good.^ Olson and Zeckhauser (1966) apply this so-called exploitation hypothesis to 
an analysis of international organizations, and axgue that a member state which places 
high absolute value to a pure public good provided by the organization will pay a share 
of the costs that is larger than its share of the benefits.^ 
When the tastes of member states axe assumed to be identical, it can be shown that 
an wealthy member state tends to contribute a larger share of its national income to 
an alliance-wide pure public good. Using a simple, one private good and one public 
good model, Andreoni (1988) demonstrates that, given identical preferences, a group 
member i wiU contribute Wi — W out of its wealth Wi to the public good if Wi > W', 
and contribute zero if WI < W'. That is, W is a critical level of wealth such that 
group members with wealth greater than W will contribute, and members with wealth 
^As Olson (1965) points out, this member will not bear all the burden of the pure public good when 
the income effect is taJcen into account. The public good is assume to be a normal good in order to 
assure the existence of a unique Nash equilibrium. 
-Olson wrote, "The moral overtones of the word 'exploitation' Eire unfortunate; no general moral 
conclusions can follow from a purely logical analysis. Since the word 'exploitation' is, however, com­
monly used to describe situations where there is a disproportion between the benefits and sacrifices of 
different people, it would be pedantic to use a different word here." (1965) 
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equal to, and smaller than W will not. W' is a function of the total public good 
contributed by all members, and it is same for all Assimiing a positive contribution, 
the share of z's wealth contributed to the public good is 1 — By differentiating this 
expression with respect to fs wealth, we get which is positive. Therefore, as z's 
wealth increases, the shaxe of its wealth contributed to the public good also increases. 
Using Speaxmaji rank correlation tests, Olson and Zeckhauser (1966) examined whether 
a disproportionate burden sharing by wealthy countries had existed ajnong the NATO 
members in 1964. They tested the null hypothesis (Ifo) of no positive correlation be­
tween GNP and defense budget as a share of GNP, and were able to reject (ffo) at the 
.05 level of significance. Following their study, the traditional burden-sharing measure 
used in the literature examines the rank correlation between defense burden (a shaxe 
of national income devoted to defense) and national income. A significant and positive 
correlation indicates the existence of disproportionate burden sharing predicted by the 
exploitation hypothesis.'' 
As discussed in Chapter 1, UN peacekeeping is likely to create not only public ben­
efits, but also contributor-specific benefits. In this case, a member state which receives 
relatively large contributor-specific benefits firom each unit of its contributions will share 
the larger burden of UN peacekeeping, compared to the ceise in which only purely public 
benefits are present.® As a result, the exploitation hypothesis may no longer hold, and 
the disproportionate burden sharing by wealthy countries would become less apparent as 
the ratio of the contributor-specific benefits to the public benefits increases. Therefore, 
one way to examine the publicness of the total benefits created by UN peacekeeping is 
to study the correlation between GDP and shaxe of GDP devoted to UN peacekeeping 
^Both the public and private goods are assumed to be normal in order to assure the existence of a 
unique Nash equilibrium. 
''Non-paxametric studies of militaxy alliance burden sharing include Russett (1970), Starr (1974), 
Sandler and Forbes (1980), eind Khanna jind Sandler (1996, 1997). 
®The joint product model and its implications on optimal alliance size, financing, stability, and 
burden shaxing are discussed by Sandler (1977). 
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(PK/GDP). In this chapter, Kendall rank correlation tests are used for this purpose. 
Four different subsets of UN member states axe selected based on the NATO member­
ship, UN peacekeeping assessment scale, and political system. Based on the Kendall 
correlation coefficients and PK/GDP ranks, the burden-sharing patterns of the four 
samples are analyzed.® According to the test results, a disproportionate burden shaxing 
by wealthy coimtries existed in the 1990s for a sample which includes only the NATO 
member states. Although the focus of this chapter is UN peacekeeping, non-UN-financed 
peace operations axe also discussed. 
2.2 Samples and Data 
In order to measure the UN peacekeeping burden, annual data on GDP and the 
contributions made toward all the special assessment accounts plus the UNFICYP vol-
untaxy contribution accoimt for the period of 1975-96 were collected for four samples 
of UN member states. The first sample contains only the NATO member states. Spain 
is included from 1982, the year it joined NATO. The second sample contains 15 ma­
jor contributors, axid the third sample contains 20 major contributors. The countries 
in these two saxnples were selected based on their peacekeeping assessment shares for 
1996. The fourth saxnple is a subset of the third sample, and it includes 15 democratic 
countries. The sample countries' special assessment account payment data were taken 
from the UN (1976—97) Status of Contributions . The UNFICYP voluntary contribution 
account payment data were taken from the biennial UN (various years) Financial Re­
port. The 1975—95 GDP figures at market prices in current US dollars were taken from 
the World Baxtk (1997) World Development Indicators 1991. The 1996 GDP figures 
were taken from the International Monetary Fimd (IMF) (1998a) International Finan-
® Although we use the term, samples to describe the sets of countries selected for the rank correlation 
tests, these samples aie by no means random seimples of the UN member states. Also, it should be noted 
that, by including all the NATO countries, the NATO sample could be considered as the population 
rather than a szimple. See McCloskey and Ziliak (1996) for details. 
Table 2.1 Sample compositions 
NATO sample Sample 2 Sample 3 Sample 4 
Belgium Australia Australia Australia 
Canada Belgium Austria Belgium 
Denmark Canada Belgium Canada 
France China Brazil Denmark 
West Germany (1975-89) France Canada Finland 
Unified Germany (1990-96) West Germany (1975-89) China France 
Greece Unified Germany (1990-96) Denmark West Germany (1975-89) 
Iceland Italy Finland Unified Germany (1990-96) 
Italy Japan France Italy 
Luxembourg Netherlands West Germany (1975-89) Japan 
Netherlands Spain Unified Germany (1990-96) Netherlands 
Norway Sweden Italy Norway 
Portugal Ukraine Japan Spain 
Spain (1982-96) United Kingdom Netherlands Sweden 
Turkey United States Norway United Kingdom 
United Kingdom USSR (1975-91) 1 Spain United States 
United States Russia (1992-96) Sweden 
Sweden 
Ukraine 
United Kingdom 
United States 
USSR (1975-91) ' 
Russia (1992-96) 
1. Belarus and Ukraine are excluded from "USSR" in Sample 2 and 
Sample 3 since they contribvited to the United Nations separately. 
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cial Statistics.' In order to examine the correlation between GDP and PK/GDP while 
isolating the influence of population differences across the sample countries, the data 
on population were needed. The 1975-95 population figures were taken from the World 
Bank (1997).® The 1996 figiires were estimated by using the annual growth rate for each 
sample country during the period of 1992-95. 
2.3 Statistical Tests for Disproportionate Peacekeeping Bur­
den Sharing 
Kendall rank correlation tests were used to test the following hypotheses: 
Hq: There wiU be no significajit correlation between a country's GDP and its share of 
GDP devoted to UN peacekeeping (PK/GDP). 
HI'. There will be a significant correlation between the variables specified in HQ. 
A significant •positive correlation between GDP and PK/GDP, if found, suggests that 
a large share of purely public benefits characterizes UN peacekeeping. Kendall rank 
correlation coefficient (T12) and Kendall partial rank correlation coefficient ('ri2,3) which 
holds sample countries' populations constant were examined for the four samples. This 
partial correlation coefficient adjusts for the population influence, if any, and then tests 
the degree of association between GDP and PK/GDP ranks. Because the samples in­
clude coimtries with vastly different populations, this variable may affect the association 
between GDP and PK/GDP, which we are interested in isolating. 
^There were some missing GDP figures that had to be estimated or taken from a comparable data 
source. The 1975-89 figures for West Germany were tsiken from the World Bank (1995) World Data 
1995 . The 1990 figure for unified Germany was taken from the UN (1996a) Statistical Yearbook 1994 • 
The 1975-86 figures for the USSR and Ukraine were estimated (backcasted) by using the annual growth 
rate of eaxii country/republic during the period of 1987-90. The 1996 figure for Ukraine was estimated 
(forecasted) by using the annueii growth rate during the period of 1992-95. 
®The 1975-89 figures for West Germany were taken from the IMF (1997a) International Financial 
Statistics Yearbook. 
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The results for the NATO sample, Sajnple 2, Sample 3, ajid. Sample 4 axe shown 
in. Table 2.2, 2.3, 2.4, and 2.5, respectively. For the NATO sample, neither of the 
Kendall tau and Kendall partial tau shows consistent rank correlation between GDP 
and PK/GDP during the 1975—90 period. None of the coefficients axe significant at the 
.10 level during this period.® A consistent positive rank correlation between the two 
variables appears in the early 1990s, starting in 1992, however. In 1992 and 1994, the 
Kendall tau were positive and significant at the .10 level. In 1994 and 1995, the Kendall 
partial tau were positive and significant at the either .10 or .05 level. For Sample 2 
and Sample 3, the Kendall tau shows no consistent rank correlation between GDP and 
PK/GDP throughout the period of 1975-96. The Kendall partial tau, however, shows a 
positive rank correlation between the two variables in the eaxly 1980s and eaxly 1990s. 
For Saxnple 2, the null hypothesis was rejected in favor of the alternative hypothesis in 
1981 and 1991 at the .05 level of significance. For Sample 3, the null hypothesis was 
rejected in 1981, 1983 and 1991 at the .10 level of significance. For Sample 4, neither of 
the KendaU tau and Kendall partial tau shows consistent rank correlation between GDP 
and PK/GDP throughout the period of 1975-96. None of the coefficients are significant 
at the .10 level. 
2.4 GDP Ranks and PK/GDP Ranks 
Table 2.6, 2.7, and 2.8 show the GDP ranks, PK/GDP ranks, and squares of the 
differences between the two ranks for the NATO sample, Saxnple 2, and Saxnple 4, 
respectively, during the period of 1980-96. 
For example, in 1980, West Germany's GDP v/^s the second highest, and its share 
® Kendall rank correlation coefficient is asymptotically normedly distributed under the null hypothesis 
of independence, emd for a sample size greater than ten, the normzil distribution provides a satisfactory 
approximation (Kendall 1970). The same could be said for Kendall partial rank correlation coefficient 
(Hoflund 1963). 
^"Sajnple 3 is not discussed here because the statistical test results for the sample are very similar to 
the results for Sample 2. 
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Table 2.2 Kendall rank correlation between GDP and 
PK/GDP: NATO, 1975-96 
Year TI2 ''"12,3 Year ri2 ''"12.3 
1975 0.08571 
(0.45) 
0.13287 
(0-69) 
1986 0.15000 
(0.81) 
0.28422 
(1.54) 
1976 0.14286 
(0.74) 
0.04683 
(0.24) 
1987 0.10000 
(0.54) 
0.21948 
(1.19) 
1977 0.14286 
(0.74) 
0.09942 
(0.52) 
1988 0.01667 
(0.09) 
0.11480 
(0.62) 
1978 0.04762 
(0.25) 
0.12056 
(0.63) 
1989 0.10000 
(0.54) 
0.26682 
(1.44) 
1979 0.23810 
(1.24) 
0.25493 
(1.32) 
1990 0.06667 
(0.36) 
0.08626 
(0.47) 
1980 0.06667 
(0.35) 
0.14578 
(0.76) 
1991 0.18333 
(0.99) 
0.23951 
(1.29) 
1981 0.04762 
(0.25) 
0.15600 
(0.81) 
1992 0.33333* 
(1.80) 
0.30188 
(1.63) 
1982 0.03333 
(0.18) 
0.18394 
(0.99) 
1993 0.13333 
(0.72) 
0.23220 
(1.25) 
1983 0.06667 
(0.36) 
0.23468 
(1.27) 
1994 0.31667* 
(1.71) 
0.34227* 
(1.85) 
1984 -0.03333 
(-0.18) 
0.14302 
(0.77) 
1995 0.28333 
(1.53) 
0.36327** 
(1.96) 
1985 -0.11667 
(-0.63) 
0.05413 
(0.28) 
1996 0.21667 
(1.17) 
0.26509 
(1.43) 
Numbers in parentheses are z-values. 
* indicates significantly different from zero at the .10 level for a 
two-tailed test. 
** indicates significantly different from zero at the .05 level for a 
two-tailed test. 
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Table 2.3 Kendall rajik correlation between GDP and 
PK/GDP: Sample 2, 1975-96 
Year 7-12 •'•12,3 Year n2 Tt2,3 
1975 0.00952 
(0.05) 
0.01905 
(0.10) 
1986 -0-10476 
(-0.54) 
0.02412 
(0.13) 
1976 0.10476 
(0.54) 
0.03839 
(0.20) 
1987 -0.29524 
(-1.53) 
-0.24016 
(-1.25) 
1977 -0.19139 
(-0.99) 
-0.12736 
(-0.66) 
1988 -0.27619 
(-1.44) 
-0.23883 
(-1.24) 
1978 0.06667 
(0.35) 
0.20693 
(1.08) 
1989 -0.27619 
(-1-44) 
-0.21653 
(-1.13) 
1979 -0.05742 
(-0.30) 
-0.04416 
(-0.23) 
1990 0.06667 
(0.35) 
-0.01309 
(-0.07) 
1980 0.00952 
(0.05) 
0.19223 
(1.00) 
1991 0.29524 
(1.53) 
0.38276** 
(1.99) 
1981 0.22967 
(1.19) 
0.37689** 
(1.96) 
1992 0.22967 
(1.19) 
0.28864 
(1.50) 
1982 0.27619 
(1.44) 
0.29842 
(1.55) 
1993 0.10476 
(0.54) 
0.23819 
(1.24) 
1983 0.04762 
(0.25) 
0.28868 
(1.50) 
1994 -0.08571 
(-0.45) 
0.01962 
(0.10) 
1984 0.02857 
(0.15) 
0.27680 
(1.44) 
1995 -0-04762 
(-0.25) 
0.02351 
(0.12) 
1985 -0.10476 
(-0.54) 
0.07927 
(0.41) 
1996 -0.1619 
(-0.84) 
-0.08447 
(-0.44) 
Numbers in psirentheses sire z-values. 
* indicates significcintly different from zero at the .10 level for a 
two-tailed test. 
** indicates significeintly different from zero at the .05 level for a 
two-tailed test. 
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Table 2.4 Kendall rank correlation between GDP and 
PK/GDP: Sample 3, 1975-96 
Year T12 Ti2,3 Yeax TI2 ''"12,3 
1975 -0.0686 
(-0.42) 
-0.00144 
(-0.01) 
1986 -0.07368 
(-0.45) 
0.08602 
(0.53) 
1976 -0.03158 
(-0.19) 
0.03097 
(0.19) 
1987 -0.21053 
(-1.30) 
-0.11085 
(-0.68) 
1977 -0.14248 
(-0.88) 
-0.03864 
(-0.24) 
1988 -0.14737 
(-0.91) 
-0.10465 
(-0.65) 
1978 -0.07368 
(-0.45) 
0.19049 
(1.17) 
1989 -0.13684 
(-0.84) 
-0.07238 
(-0.45) 
1979 -0.13193 
(-0.81) 
-0.04279 
(-0.26) 
1990 0.10526 
(0.65) 
0.04942 
(0.30) 
1980 -0.06316 
(-0.39) 
0.20291 
(1.25) 
1991 0.11579 
(0.71) 
0.28285* 
(1.74) 
1981 0.03694 
(0.23) 
0.28254* 
(1.74) 
1992 0.10026 
(0.62) 
0.21707 
(1.34) 
1982 -0.01053 
(-0.06) 
0.16154 
(1.00) 
1993 -0.01053 
(-0.06) 
0.18388 
(1.13) 
1983 -0.01053 
(-0.06) 
0.27204* 
(1.68) 
1994 -0.09474 
(-0.58) 
0.05044 
(0.31) 
1984 -0.05263 
(-0-32) 
0.22834 
(1.41) 
1995 -0.02105 
(-0.13) 
0.08512 
(0.52) 
1985 -0.14737 
(-0.91) 
0.09448 
(0.58) 
1996 -0.01053 
(-0.06) 
0.07019 
(0.43) 
Numbers in parentheses are z-vcilues. 
* indicates significantly different from zero at the .10 level for a 
two-tailed test. 
** indicates significantly different from zero at the .05 level for a 
two-tailed test. 
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Table 2.5 Kendall rank correlatioa between GDP and 
PK/GDP: Sample 4, 1975-96 
Yeax ri2 ''"12,3 Year n2 "''12,3 
1975 -0.02857 
(-0.15) 
0-11542 
(0-60) 
1986 -0.18095 
(-0.94) 
0.05241 
(0.27) 
1976 0.04762 
(0.25) 
0-05113 
(0.27) 
1987 -0.29524 
(-1.53) 
-0.11653 
(-0.61) 
1977 -0.20000 
(-1.04) 
-0.12355 
(-0-64) 
1988 -0.20000 
(-1.04) 
-0.08661 
(-0.45) 
1978 -0-16190 
(-0.84) 
0-00433 
(0-02) 
1989 -0.14286 
(-0-74) 
-0-03553 
(-0-18) 
1979 -0-08571 
(-0.45) 
0-07715 
(0.40) 
1990 0.20000 
(1.04) 
0-00437 
(0.02) 
1980 -0-23810 
(-1.24) 
-0.09913 
(-0.52) 
1991 0.08571 
(0.45) 
0.01712 
(0.09) 
1981 -0.04762 
(-0.25) 
0.08702 
(0.45) 
1992 0.06667 
(0.35) 
-0.18991 
(-0.99) 
1982 -0.02857 
(-0.15) 
0.02548 
(0.13) 
1993 -0-14286 
(-0.74) 
-0.15390 
(-0.80) 
1983 -0.06667 
(-0.35) 
0.16616 
(0.86) 
1994 -0.29524 
(-1.53) 
-0.15592 
(-0.81) 
1984 -0.14286 
(-0.74) 
0.02016 
(0.10) 
1995 -0.10476 
(-0.54) 
-0.02096 
(-0.11) 
1985 -0.18095 
(-0.94) 
-0.08254 
(-0.43) 
1996 -0.12381 
(-0.64) 
-0.20872 
(-1.08) 
Numbers in paurentheses axe z-values, 
* indicates significantly different from zero at the .10 level for a 
two-tailed test. 
** indicates significantly different from zero at the .05 level for a 
two-tailed test. 
Table 2.6 GDP rank, PK/GDP rank, and squared rank difference: 
NATO, 1980-96 
Country 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 
United States 1 4 9 1 8 49 1 7 36 1 12 121 1 11 100 1 12 121 
Germany ^ 2 11 81 2 5 9 2 4 4 2 8 36 2 8 36 2 4 4 
France 3 13 100 3 7 16 3 12 81 3 2 1 3 6 9 3 13 100 
United Kingdom 4 6 4 4 1 9 4 3 1 4 3 1 4 a O 1 4 5 1 
Italy 5 9 16 5 14 81 5 11 36 5 9 16 5 13 64 5 10 25 
Canada 6 1 25 6 10 16 6 8 4 6 13 49 6 12 36 6 11 25 
Spain ^ 7 14 49 7 14 49 7 14 49 7 14 49 
Netherlands 7 12 25 7 9 4 8 10 4 8 11 9 8 4 16 8 7 1 
Belgium 8 3 25 8 12 16 9 13 16 9 1 64 9 1 64 9 1 64 
Turkey 9 15 36 9 15 36 10 15 25 10 15 25 11 16 25 10 16 36 
Denmark 10 7 9 11 2 81 12 1 121 12 7 25 12 7 25 12 6 36 
Norway 11 2 81 10 6 16 11 5 36 11 6 25 10 10 0 11 9 4 
Greece 12 5 49 12 3 81 13 6 49 13 4 81 13 5 64 13 3 100 
Portugal 13 14 1 13 13 0 14 16 4 14 16 4 14 15 1 14 15 1 
Luxembourg 14 8 36 14 4 100 15 2 169 15 5 100 15 2 169 15 2 169 
Iceland 15 10 25 15 11 16 16 9 49 16 10 36 16 9 49 16 8 64 
Total 522 530 684 642 708 800 
1, West Germany (1980-89) and unified Germany (1990-96). 
2. Spain joined NATO in 1982. 
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Table 2.6 (Continued) 
1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 
1 13 144 1 13 144 1 13 144 1 11 100 1 9 64 
2 6 16 2 4 4 2 8 36 2 6 16 2 8 36 
3 1 4 3 6 9 3 5 4 3 3 0 3 2 1 
5 4 1 5 2 9 5 2 9 5 5 0 5 3 4 
4 12 64 4 12 64 4 10 36 4 12 64 4 13 81 
6 11 25 6 9 9 6 11 25 6 10 16 6 7 1 
7 14 49 7 14 49 7 15 64 7 14 49 7 14 49 
8 5 9 8 8 0 8 6 4 8 4 16 8 10 4 
9 2 49 9 3 36 9 3 36 9 1 64 9 5 16 
12 15 9 12 16 16 12 16 16 10 15 25 10 16 36 
10 8 4 10 7 9 10 9 1 11 7 16 11 11 0 
11 3 64 11 1 100 11 4 49 12 8 16 12 4 64 
13 7 36 13 5 64 13 1 144 13 13 0 14 1 169 
14 16 4 14 15 1 14 14 0 14 16 4 13 15 4 
15 9 36 15 10 25 15 7 64 15 2 169 15 6 81 
16 10 36 16 11 25 16 12 16 16 9 49 16 12 16 
550 564 648 604 626 
Table 2.6 
Country 1992 1993 
United States 1 1 0 1 11 100 
Germany 2 9 49 2 8 36 
France 3 3 0 3 3 0 
United Kingdom 5 2 9 5 1 16 
Italy 4 12 64 4 5 1 
Canada 7 4 9 6 4 4 
Spain 6 14 64 7 13 36 
Netherlands 8 7 1 8 9 1 
Belgium 9 5 16 9 12 9 
Turkey 10 16 36 10 16 36 
Denmark 11 10 1 11 7 16 
Norway 12 8 16 12 10 4 
Greece 14 13 1 14 14 0 
Portugal 13 15 4 13 15 4 
Luxembourg 15 6 81 15 6 81 
Iceland 16 11 25 16 2 196 
Total 376 540 
(Continued) 
1994 1995 1996 
1 6 25 1 13 144 1 13 144 
2 10 64 2 10 64 2 7 25 
3 13 100 3 1 4 3 4 1 
4 1 9 4 2 4 4 9 25 
5 7 4 5 4 1 5 3 4 
6 2 16 6 3 9 6 5 1 
7 3 16 7 8 1 7 2 25 
8 9 1 8 7 1 8 8 0 
9 4 25 9 12 9 9 1 64 
10 8 4 10 6 16 10 11 1 
11 16 25 11 16 25 11 14 9 
12 5 49 12 9 9 12 12 0 
13 15 4 13 15 4 13 16 9 
14 14 0 14 14 0 14 15 1 
15 11 16 15 5 100 15 10 25 
16 12 16 16 11 25 16 6 100 
374 416 434 
Table 2.7 GDP rank, PK/GDP rank, and squared rank difference: 
Sample 2, 1980-96 
Country 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 
United States 1 4 9 1 5 16 1 4 9 1 10 81 1 7 36 1 10 81 
Japan 2 11 81 2 10 64 2 10 64 2 9 49 2 10 64 2 11 81 
Germany ' 3 8 25 3 2 1 3 2 1 3 5 4 3 6 9 3 2 1 
France 4 10 36 4 4 0 4 9 25 4 2 4 4 5 1 4 12 64 
United Kingdom 5 5 0 5 1 16 5 1 16 5 3 4 6 2 16 6 3 9 
Italy 6 7 1 6 11 25 6 7 1 7 6 1 7 11 16 7 6 1 
USSR (Russia) ^ 7 12 25 7 12 25 7 13 36 6 14 64 5 12 49 5 8 9 
Canada 8 1 49 8 7 1 8 5 9 8 11 9 8 8 0 8 9 1 
Spain 9 14 25 10 15 25 10 15 25 11 12 1 11 14 9 11 14 9 
China 10 15 25 9 15 36 9 8 1 9 13 16 9 13 16 9 15 36 
Netherlands 11 9 4 12 6 36 12 6 36 12 8 16 12 3 81 12 5 49 
Australia 12 3 81 11 8 9 11 11 0 10 7 9 10 9 1 10 7 9 
Sweden 13 6 49 13 3 100 13 3 100 13 4 81 13 4 81 13 4 81 
Belgium 14 2 144 14 9 25 14 12 4 14 1 169 14 1 169 15 1 196 
Ukraine 15 13 4 15 13 4 15 14 1 15 15 0 15 15 0 14 13 I 
Total 558 383 328 508 548 628 
1. West Germany (1980-89) and unified Germany (1990-96). 
2. USSR (1980-90) and Russia (1991-96), Belarus and Ul(raine are excluded from 
"USSR" since they contributed to the United Nations separately. 
9 
49 
4 
4 
25 
36 
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Table 2.7 (Continued) 
1986 
1 12 121 
2 13 121 
3 7 16 
4 2 4 
6 4 4 
5 11 36 
7 1 36 
8 10 4 
10 15 25 
9 14 25 
11 5 36 
12 8 16 
13 6 49 
14 3 121 
15 9 36 
650 
1987 
1 12 121 
2 13 121 
3 6 9 
4 7 9 
6 3 9 
5 11 36 
7 1 36 
8 10 4 
9 15 36 
10 14 16 
11 9 4 
12 8 16 
13 5 64 
14 4 100 
15 2 169 
750 
1988 
1 12 121 
2 14 144 
3 7 16 
4 5 1 
6 3 9 
5 10 25 
7 1 36 
8 11 9 
9 15 36 
10 13 9 
12 6 36 
11 9 4 
13 8 25 
14 4 100 
15 2 169 
740 
1989 
1 11 100 
2 14 144 
3 7 16 
4 4 0 
6 6 0 
5 12 49 
7 1 36 
8 9 1 
9 15 36 
10 13 9 
12 5 49 
11 10 1 
13 8 25 
14 3 121 
15 2 169 
756 
1990 
1 10 81 
2 3 1 
3 8 25 
4 4 0 
6 5 1 
5 13 64 
7 1 36 
8 7 1 
9 15 36 
10 14 16 
12 11 1 
11 9 4 
13 12 1 
14 6 64 
15 2 169 
500 
Table 2.7 
Country 1992 1993 
United States 1 1 0 1 9 64 
Japan 2 10 64 2 12 100 
Germany 3 8 25 3 7 16 
France 4 3 1 4 2 4 
United Kingdom 6 2 16 6 1 25 
Italy 5 11 36 5 6 1 
USSR (Russia) 9 15 36 10 10 0 
Canada 8 4 16 7 4 9 
Spain 7 13 36 8 13 25 
China 10 12 4 9 14 25 
Netherlands 11 7 16 11 8 9 
Australia 12 6 36 12 5 49 
Sweden 13 9 16 14 3 121 
Belgium 14 5 81 13 11 4 
Ukraine 15 15 0 15 15 0 
Total 383 452 
(Continued) 
1994 1995 1996 
1 7 36 1 13 144 1 12 121 
2 13 121 2 11 81 2 14 144 
3 11 64 3 10 49 3 8 25 
4 12 64 4 2 4 4 5 1 
5 2 9 5 3 4 6 4 4 
6 9 9 6 7 1 5 10 25 
10 1 81 12 1 121 10 1 81 
7 3 16 8 4 16 8 6 4 
9 5 16 9 9 0 9 3 36 
8 14 36 7 14 49 7 13 36 
11 10 1 10 8 4 12 9 9 
12 8 16 11 6 25 11 11 0 
14 4 
o
 
o
 14 5 81 14 7 49 
13 6 49 13 12 1 13 2 121 
15 15 0 15 15 0 15 15 0 
618 580 656 
Table 2.8 GDP rank, PK/GDP rank, and squared rank difference: 
Sample 4, 1980-96 
Country 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 
United States 1 5 16 1 7 36 1 6 25 1 13 144 1 10 81 1 12 121 
Japan 2 14 144 2 13 121 2 12 100 2 11 81 2 13 121 2 13 121 
Germany ' 3 11 64 3 3 0 3 3 0 3 7 16 3 7 16 3 2 1 
France 4 13 81 4 6 4 4 10 36 4 2 4 4 5 1 4 14 100 
United Kingdom 5 6 1 5 1 16 5 2 9 5 3 4 5 2 9 5 3 4 
Italy 6 9 9 6 14 64 6 9 9 6 8 4 6 14 64 6 8 4 
Canada 7 1 36 7 9 4 7 7 0 7 14 49 7 11 16 7 11 16 
Spain 8 15 49 8 15 49 8 15 49 9 15 36 9 15 36 9 15 36 
Netherlands 9 12 9 10 8 4 10 8 4 10 10 0 10 3 49 10 6 16 
Australia 10 4 36 9 10 1 9 13 16 8 9 1 8 12 16 8 9 1 
Sweden 11 8 9 11 5 36 11 5 36 11 4 49 11 4 49 11 4 49 
Belgium 12 3 81 12 12 0 12 14 4 12 1 121 12 1 121 12 1 121 
Denmark 13 7 36 14 2 144 14 1 169 14 6 64 14 6 64 14 5 81 
Norway 14 2 144 13 4 81 13 4 81 13 5 64 13 8 25 13 7 36 
Finland 15 10 25 15 11 16 15 11 16 15 12 9 15 9 36 15 10 25 
Total 740 576 554 646 704 732 
1. West Germany (1980-89) and unified Germany (1990-96). 
16 
81 
9 
4 
25 
81 
1 
49 
36 
0 
1 
1 
36 
144 
4 
488 
Table 2.8 (Continued) 
1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 
1 13 144 1 13 144 1 13 144 1 11 100 1 9 64 
2 14 144 2 14 144 2 14 144 2 14 144 2 1 1 
3 7 16 3 5 4 3 6 9 3 5 4 3 7 16 
4 1 9 4 6 4 4 4 0 4 2 4 4 2 4 
6 4 4 6 2 16 6 1 25 6 4 4 6 3 9 
5 12 49 5 12 49 5 10 25 5 13 64 5 14 81 
7 10 9 7 10 9 7 11 16 7 9 4 7 6 1 
8 15 49 8 15 49 8 15 49 8 15 49 8 15 49 
9 5 16 9 9 0 10 5 25 10 3 49 10 10 0 
10 8 4 10 8 4 9 9 0 9 10 1 9 8 1 
11 6 25 11 4 49 11 7 16 11 7 16 11 12 1 
12 2 100 12 3 81 12 2 100 12 1 121 12 5 49 
13 9 16 13 7 36 13 8 25 14 6 64 14 11 9 
14 3 121 14 1 169 15 3 144 15 8 49 15 4 121 
15 11 16 15 11 16 14 12 4 13 12 1 13 13 0 
722 774 726 674 406 
Table 2.8 
Country 1992 1993 
United States 1 1 0 1 12 121 
Japan 2 13 121 2 14 144 
Germany 3 10 49 3 9 36 
France 4 3 1 4 3 1 
United Kingdom 6 2 16 6 1 25 
Italy 5 14 81 5 7 4 
Canada 8 4 16 7 5 4 
Spain 7 15 64 8 15 49 
Netherlands 9 8 1 9 10 1 
Australia 10 7 9 10 6 16 
Sweden 11 12 1 12 4 64 
Belgium 12 5 49 11 13 4 
Denmark 13 11 4 13 8 25 
Norway 14 9 25 14 11 9 
Finland 15 6 81 15 2 169 
Total 518 672 
(Continued) 
1994 1995 1996 
1 8 49 1 15 196 1 14 169 
2 15 169 2 13 121 2 15 169 
3 13 100 3 12 81 3 8 25 
4 14 100 4 1 9 4 4 0 
5 1 16 5 2 9 6 3 9 
6 10 16 6 7 1 5 10 25 
7 3 16 7 3 16 7 5 4 
8 5 9 8 10 4 8 2 36 
9 12 9 9 9 0 10 9 1 
10 9 1 10 6 16 9 12 9 
12 4 64 12 4 64 12 7 25 
11 6 25 11 14 9 11 1 100 
13 11 4 13 8 25 13 11 4 
14 7 49 14 11 9 14 13 1 
15 2 169 15 5 100 15 6 81 
796 660 658 
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of GDP devoted to UN peacekeeping weis ranked eleventh among the NATO members. 
Therefore the squaxed rank difference was (2 — 11)^ = 81. The closer the GDP rank and 
PK/GDP rank of a covmtry is, the smaller will be the squaxed rajik difference. When 
there is a perfect positive correlation between the rank orderings of the two variables, 
the squaxed rank differences will be zero for ail the sample countries. 
Among the NATO members, France and the United Kingdom contributed relatively 
laxge shares of their GDP to UN peacekeeping during the first half of the 1990s, France 
in 1994 being an exception. Canada and Itaiy have also climbed up the PK/GDP 
ranking since 1992 and 1993 respectively. United States axid Germaxiy, on the other 
hand, contributed relatively small shaxes of their GDP during the same time period, 
except for the United States in 1992. Among the smaller NATO members, Greece has 
fallen to the near bottom of the PK/GDP ranking in the 1990s. 
In Sample 2, Japan has been contributing relatively small share of its GDP to UN 
peacekeeping throughout the 1980s and 1990s, except for 1990. Belgium, one of the 
smallest coimtries in Sample 2, contributed relatively laxge shaxe of its GDP for the 
most years in the 1980s. Also, the USSR and Ukraine were ranked first and second, 
respectively in terms of PK/GDP during the late 1980s until the collapse of the Soviet 
Union in 1991. Since 1994, Russia has been again ranked first. Not significant, yet strong 
negative correlation between GDP axid PK/GDP observed in the late 1980s for Sample 
2 could be attributed to the low PK/GDP ranking of the two wealthiest countries, the 
United States and Japan, and the high ranking of the two poorest countries in the 
sample, Belgium and Ukraine. 
The correlation between GDP and PK/GDP for Sample 4 during the 1990s is weak, 
especially compared to the resxilts for the NATO sample. From Table 2.6 and 2.8, it is 
clear that the exclusion of small NATO members ranked low in terms of PK/GDP, such 
6 Spearman rank correlation coefficient (r,) could be calculated by the formula, 1 — • where 
cP is the sum of squared rank differences, and n is the sample size. 
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as Greece and Portugal, and the inclusion of Japan ajid Finland are the main causes of 
this result. Finland, a coimtry with the smallest GDP in the sample, has climbed up 
the PK/GDP ranking in the 1990s. Adding Sweden to the sample also contributed to 
the low correlation between the two variables in 1994 and 1995. 
2.5 Analysis of the Test Results 
The most interesting resxilt of the rank correlation tests is the evidence of increased 
disproportionate burden sharing among the NATO members in the first half of the 1990s. 
It should be noted that during this period, the total UN peacekeeping expenditures 
increased sharply from approximately $490 million in 1991 to $3,364 million in 1995, 
due mainly to three large-scale operations, UNTAC (1992-93), UNPROFOR (1992-95), 
and UNOSOM II (1993-95), of which UNPROFOR in the former Yugoslavia being by 
fax the most expensive. As the total UN peacekeeping expenditures decreased to $1,840 
million in 1996, both of the Kendall tau and Kendall partial tau decreased somewhat, 
from 0.28333 to 0.21667, and from 0.36327 to 0.26509, respectively. For the NATO 
sample, there appears to be a direct relationship between the size of UN peacekeeping 
expenditures and disproportionate burden sharing. 
For the other samples, it is rather difficult to identify any clear trend in burden 
shaiing. As discussed at the beginning of this chapter, the exploitation hypothesis 
predicts that aji wealthy country contributes a laxger shaxe of its GDP to the provision of 
public good when the tastes of member states are assumed to be identical. If the group is 
composed of coimtries with heterogeneous tastes, it is not necessarily an wealthy country 
who places relatively high value to the public good, and therefore we can not always 
expect to see strong positive correlation between GDP and PK/GDP. Being composed 
of not only the NATO countries, but also Asian countries, communist coimtries and 
non-NATO European coimtries, Sample 2, 3, and 4 are less homogeneous in terms of 
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geographic location and political system, compaxed to the NATO sample. This fact 
should be teiken into accoimt when the test results for these samples are studied. Unlike 
the deterrence effects created by a military alliance, a coimtry's valuation of public 
benefits of regioncil peace created by a UN peacekeeping operation could be highly 
dependent on the distance between the coxmtry and the conflict axea. In some ca^es, an 
operation could be even considered as a local public good, rather than a global public 
good if valuation of the benefits by countries in distant regions is extremely small. When 
sample countries are not homogenous in terms of geographic location and/or political 
system, disproportionate biu-den shaxing by wealthy countries might not be observed 
even if the ratio of public benefits to the total benefits of UN peacekeeping is large. 
Although the NATO sample shows increased disproportionate burden sharing by 
wealthy member states in the 1990s, the United States still bears relatively small burden, 
especially compared to France and the United Kingdom, two other permanent members 
of the Security Council. An explanation for this finding is a possible, relatively wide 
gap between positions taJcen by the United Nations and by the United States on various 
issues. When a gap between them widens, the US valuation of the public benefits created 
by the United Nations is likely to become smaller, and as a result, the United States is 
likely to bear smaller burden than predicted by the exploitation hypothesis. In this case, 
the low PK/GDP ranking of the United States does not necessarily imply a small ratio 
of public benefits to the total benefits of UN peacekeeping. The United Nations, which 
was composed of 51 coimtries when established in 1945, increased its membership to 
185 coimtries by the end of 1998, mostly by adding more and more developing countries 
in Africa and Asia. With each member state having one vote in the General Assembly, 
the more universal the United Nations becomes, the less likely it is that the interests 
of developed member states are represented by the organization. As the gap between 
positions talcen by the United Nations and by major financial contributors widens, there 
is a greater possibility of United Nations finding itself in serious financial difficiilty. For 
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smaller, ajid more homogeneous organizations such as NATO, this problem is expected 
to be less significant. 
One way to correct the problem is to adopt a voting rule which gives each member 
state a voting power proportional to its share of financial contributions, as done by the 
finajiciai organizations of the UN system (Frey and Gygi 1990). For example, in the 
IMF, the voting shares of the United States, Germany, Japan, France, and the United 
Kingdom as of April 1998 are 17.78, 5.53, 5.53, 4.98, and 4.98 percent, respectively 
(IMF 1998b). The adoption of such a voting rule by the General Assembly and Security 
Coimcil is likely to narrow the interest gap between the United Nations and its major 
financial contributors, although strong opposition by Russia, China, and other develop­
ing countries axe expected. Also, the correction of the problem would not solve the 
suboptimality problem associated with the publicness of the UN peacekeeping benefits. 
2.6 The Gulf War and Other Non-UN-financed Peace Opera­
tions 
In response to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1990, UN-authorized and US-
led massive multinational military forces were assembled in Saudi Arabia (Operation 
Desert Shield), and launched attacks against Iraqi forces in January 1991 (Operation 
Desert Storm), which ended with the liberation of Kuwait in February 1991. Although 
the total costs of US forces deployment reached approximately S6l billion, S53 billion, 
or 87 percent of the costs was financed by Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Japan, Germany and 
other US allies as shown in Table 2.9 (US Department of Defense 1992, Appendix P). 
amendment to the Foreign Relations Authorization bill introduced in 1985 by the junior senator 
from Kajisas, Nancy Kassebaum (the Kassebaum amendment) called for withholding of 20 percent of 
US assessed contributions to the United Nations until the General Assembly adopts weighted voting on 
budgetary matters. The United Nations responded with General Assembly Resolution 41/213, which 
introduced consensus-approval to the budget-setting process of the General Assembly. See Gregg (1993) 
for detziils. 
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Fraxice and the United Kingdom contributed troops and equipment. 
Table 2.9 Foreign contributions to US 
Desert Shield/Storm costs 
(in millions of US dollars) 
1990 1991 
Kuwait $2,506 $13,552 
Saudi Arabia 2,503 13,500 
Japan 1,676 8,332 
Germany 955 5,500 
UAE 1,000 3,088 
Korea 80 171 
Others 3 26 
Total $8,724 $44,169 
SOURCE: US Department of Defense (1992) Ap­
pendix P. 
Since the Gulf Wax, from time to time, the United Nations relied on smaller-scale 
peace operations led by the United States, France, or NATO: US-led UNITAF in 
Somalia, NATO-led peace operations in the former Yugoslavia, French-led Operation 
Turquoise in Rwanda, US-led MNF in Haiti. Table 2.10 shows the US expenditures 
on these non-UN-led operations ajad the support for UN-led operations during the fis­
cal years 1992-95. From the table, it is clear that the payments toward the special 
assessment accounts are only a fraction of total US peacekeeping expenditures for the 
regions. After the termination of UNPROFOR in December 1995, NATO established 
IFOR, which wcLS later succeeded by SFOR. Through IFOR and SFOR, the United 
States expended approximately $2,489 million in the fiscal year 1996, and $2,271 million 
in the fiscal yeax 1997 (US General Accounting Office 1998). 
Due to limited data availability, only assessed contributions to UN-led (UN-financed) 
peacekeeping were considered for testing of disproportionate burden shaxing in the pre­
vious sections. However, since the wealthiest countries have contributed greatly to the 
'^^These figures are the Depcirtment of Defense's incremental costs for military operations in and 
around Bosnia and Herzegovina. They do not include the expenditures of the US civilian agencies. The 
United States provides approximately 25 percent of SFOR's 31,000 troops. 
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Table 2.10 US expenditures for peace operations in 
Somalia, former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, and 
Haiti: 1992-95 fiscal years 
(in millions of US doUars) 
Fiscal year 1992 1993 1994 1995 
SomaUa $ 92.9 $1124.8 S913.3 S 92.1 
(Paid US assessment (0-0) (40.9) (330.9) (16.9) 
for UNOSOM) 
Former Yugoslavia 126.7 
(Paid US assessment (76.4) 
for UNPROFOR) 
408.7 959.0 692.5 ^ 
(70.1) (459.7) (179.8) 
Rwanda 22.1 24.8 
(Paid US assessment (0.0) (0.0) 
for UNOMUR and 
UN AMIR) 
261.4 
(34.0) 
265.4 
(75.5) 
Haiti 79.7 30.4 530.8 875.8 
(Paid US assessment (0-0) (0-0) (0-5) (51.9) 
for UNMIH) 
1. The figure does not include costs related to the IFOR 
deployment. 
SOURCE: US General Accounting Office (1996). 
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Gulf Wax axid other aon-UN-led (non-UN-finajiced) operations, the findings for UN-led 
operations cleaxly underestimate the disproportionate burden shaxing for peace opera­
tions in the 1990s. As a rough attempt to show this conjecture, for the NATO sample 
and Sample 4, some informed adjustments to the PK/GDP rankings are made, and 
then the rank correlation between GDP and PK/GDP axe recalculated. To adjust for 
the Gulf War effort in 1990 and 1991, the Japanese and German contributions to the 
US forces deployment were added to their respective UN peacekeeping assessed contri­
butions. In Sample 4, the United States now receives a PK/GDP rank of 1 in both 1990 
and 1991. Japan receives a rank of 2 in 1990 and 3 in 1991. Germany receives a rank of 
3 in 1990 and 2 in 1991. The United Kingdom receives a rank of 4, and France receives 
a rank of 5 in both 1990 and 1991. In the NATO saxnple, the United States receives a 
PK/GDP rank of 1, Germany a rank of 2, the United Kingdom a rank of 3, and France 
a rank of 4 for both 1990 and 1991. For the period of 1992-96, a PK/GDP rank of 1 
is assigned to the United States, a rank of 2 to the United Kingdom, a rank of 3 to 
France, and a rank of 4 to Germany for both the NATO sample and Sample 4. These 
assignments correspond to the rank of troop deployment for IFOR, as reported by the 
US Depaxtment of Defense (1996), and the countries' UN peacekeeping efforts. 
The test results axe shown in Table 2.11. For the NATO sample, the 1990 and 1991 
coefficients axe significant at the .10 level, and the 1992-96 coefficients are significant 
at the .05 level. For Saxnple 4, the 1990 and 1991 coefficients axe significant at the .05 
level. Although the adjustments are necessarily ad hoc, it still is informed and quite 
suggestive that a much greater degree of disproportionate peacekeeping burden sharing 
by wealthy countries existed in the 1990s. 
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Table 2.11 Kendall rank correlation be­
tween GDP and PK/GDP: 
NATO and Sample 4, adjusted 
for non-UN-financed operations: 
1990-96 
Year 
1990 
NATO sajnple (ria) 
0.33333* 
(1.80) 
Sample 4 (ri2) 
0.42857** 
(2.23) 
1991 0.35000* 
(1.89) 
0.39048** 
(2.03) 
1992 0.41667** 
(2.25) 
0.18095 
(0.94) 
1993 0.40000** 
(2-16) 
0.20000 
(1.04) 
1994 0.65000** 
(3.51) 
0.20000 
(1.04) 
1995 0.58333** 
(3.15) 
0.31429 
(1.63) 
1996 0.55000** 
(2.97) 
0.29524 
(1.53) 
Numbers in parentheses are z-values. 
* indicates significantly different from zero at the .10 
level for a two-tailed test. 
** indicates significantly different from zero at the .05 
level for a two-tailed test. 
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2.7 Concluding Remarks 
This chapter examined the patterns of UN peacekeeping financial burden sharing 
among the selected member states during the period of 1975-96. Non-parametric sta­
tistical tests were used to study the rank correlation between GDP and a share of GDP 
devoted to UN peacekeeping. The test results show that, for the NATO sample, wealthy 
member states were assuming a disproportionate burden of UN peacekeeping in the 
1990s. This indicates, according to Olson's exploitation hypothesis, an increased ra­
tio of public benefits to the total benefits created by UN peacekeeping, and, increased 
suboptimality of the UN peacekeeping efforts during that time period. 
The examination of the PK/GDP ranks reveals that, even among the NATO sample 
in the 1990s, the United States was bearing relatively smaJl burden of UN peacekeeping. 
As of February 28, 1998, UN member states owe approximately Si,538 million for UN 
peacekeeping arrears, and of which, 59.6 percent is owed by the United States (US Gen­
eral Accoxmting Office 1998). In other words, the single most serious financial threat 
faced by UN peacekeeping is the undercontribution of the wealthiest coimtry, aad not 
the free-riding of smaller countries. If the UN peacekeeping expenditures are to be main­
tained at, or increased beyond the early 1990s level, the United Nations should seriously 
consider the adoption of IMF-type voting nile, or more realistically, the reductioa of its 
financial dependence on the United States. 
Mainly due to its poor logistics, the United Nations is not capable of conducting 
successful Chapter VII peace enforcement operations. When such operations axe needed, 
it must rely on coalitions of its member states. During the 1990s, the United States 
led Operation Desert Shield/Storm and other enforcement operations in Somalia and 
Haiti. It has also participated in the NATO operations in the former Yugoslavia. When 
these non-UN-financed operations axe considered, the United States and other wealthy 
countries seemed willing to share large burden. As fax as the Gulf War is concerned, 
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however, it should be noted that these oil-dependent industrialized countries are likely to 
place more value to peace in the Middle East than other non-Middle Eastern countries 
do. 
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CHAPTER 3 UN PEACEKEEPING CONTRIBUTION 
FUNCTION 
3.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter, non-paxametric statistical tests axe used to study the pat­
terns of UN peacekeeping financial burden sharing among selected UN member states. 
The purpose of this chapter is to go beyond the use of simple rank correlation to ex­
plain financial support of UN peacekeeping by member states. Since the seminal study 
by Olson and Zeckhauser (1966), an extensive literature has developed to investigate 
militaxy expenditures of countries facing a common threat. In many of these studies, 
it is assumed that a coimtry's military expenditxires depend on such variables as the 
country's national income, the relative price of defense, the military expenditures of its 
allies, axid the militaxy expenditures of its enemies. The expenditure function is esti­
mated for each country, using time-series data ajid paraxnetric statistics. Murdoch and 
Saxidler (1984), for instance, present a joint product model of military alliances, in which 
a representative ally allocates its resources between a military activity and a nonmili-
tary activity. In their model, an ally's arsenal jointly produces alliance-wide public good 
(deterrence) and a nation-specific good (e.g. internal security, the development of an 
arms industry). The derived demand fxmction for the military activities is estimated for 
nine NATO member states, using the seemingly unrelated regression method. Using full 
income approach, Sandler and Murdoch (1990) derive system of demand equations for 
distinguishing between Nash-Coumot and Lindahl behavior, and between pure public 
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and joint product model. Then, they apply the techniques to the NATO alliance, and 
estimate the military expenditure fxmctions for ten NATO member states, using the 
two-stage least square estimation method.^ 
Using a similar approach, we derive a reduced-form UN peacekeeping contribution 
function based on a joint product model of peacekeeping in which both contributor-
specific and global public benefits are present. Next, these contribution functions are 
estimated for a sample of 25 UN member states for the period of 1975-96. The sample 
includes the five permanent members of the Security Council, sixteen Group B countries, 
and four Group C countries. A contribution function is estimated for each country, 
while accounting for the simtiltaneity problem associated with public good allocation 
problems. Pooling restrictions axe also tested to ascertain whether the efficiency of the 
estimates can be increased for some sample covmtries whose coefficients axe statistically 
indistinguishable from one another. Finally, contribution functions axe re-estimated for 
the appropriately pooled sample. 
3.2 Theoretical Model 
To derive a peacekeeping contribution function, we assume an n-nation model in 
which each country is represented by a imitaxy actor who maximizes utility by allo­
cating money between peacekeeping and all other activities. The fth country's utility 
depends on three essential commodities: a private nation-specific characteristic (y,), a 
contributor-specific chaxacteristic (x,) derived from peacekeeping activities, and a global 
purely public chaxacteristic (Z) also derived from peacekeeping activities. The private 
chaxacteristic yi represents benefits associated with all activities other than peacekeep­
ing. UN peacekeeping can be financed by voluntary contributions (e.g., contributions 
simultaneous equation method is used also by Hilton ajid Vu (1991), and Murdoch, Sandler, and 
Hansen (1991) for NATO, by McGuire (1982) for the US-Isreieli alliance, emd by Okamura (1991) for 
the US-Japanese alliance. 
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to UNFICYP), special eissessmeiits, or the UN regulax budget. The sum of contribu­
tions to special assessment accounts and UNFICYP volimtaxy contribution account will 
be treated as discretionary contributions, denoted by g,- for the zth country. For the 
n-nation sampie, total discretionary contributions are 
Q = Q i  +  Q i ,  (3-1) 
where Qi reflects peacekeeping spillins equal to the sum of such contributions to UN 
peacekeeping activities by the other n — 1 countries. 
In terms of final commodities, the ith country's utility function is 
£ / •  =  £ / • " ( ! , , ( 3 - 2 )  
where is the global security associated with the residual, exogenous support of UN 
peacekeeping coming from the UN regulax budget, payments by the non-sample coun­
tries, and any other imspecified sources. Ei is a taste-shifting paxameter. It can involve 
axiy factor that influences the utility derived from peacekeeping such as the country's 
trading position or openness. The public characteristic Z derives from the country's 
own discretionary peacekeeping contributions and those of the other n — 1 countries, so 
that 
Z = Zi Zi, (3-3) 
where Zi = denotes the spillins of global security coming from discretionary 
peacekeeping contributions by the other countries. 
To transform the utility function from final commodities or characteristics to ob­
servable activities, we must specify the underlying relationship or technologies for these 
characteristics and the activities that produce them. A unit of the private good z/,- is 
assumed to produce a unit of the characteristic y,-. Similaxly, a unit of yields a unit 
of the security characteristic Q^. Discretionary peacekeeping is depicted as giving joint 
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products, Xi and 2,-. In particular, a fixed proportions relationship relates discretionary 
peacekeeping and its contributor-specific and public characteristics, so that 
Xi = aqi (z = 1,n) (3.4) 
and 
Zi = 79.- {i = 1, —(3-5) 
with a and 7 being positive parameters. By substituting (3.5) into (3.3), we can write 
the public characteristic Z in terms of discretionary peacekeeping: 
Z = 7(^i + Qi). (3-6) 
Finally, the substitution of (3.6) and (3.4) into (3.2) expresses the zth country's utility 
function in terms of the observable activities: 
[/' = + 4). Q", Ei). (3.7) 
A few remaxks about the utility function (3.7) are useful. First, each country's utility 
function is assumed increasing and strictly concave in its 5 arguments. Second, because 
we are primarily interested in the empirical exercise of estimating the associated contri­
bution functions for discretionary peacekeeping qi for the n countries and cannot observe 
the fixed proportion paxameters per se, we shall normalize them to equal one. Thus, the 
basic utility function is represented as 
W = U'iyu qi, 9, + Qi, Q", Ei) (3.8) 
for each sample coxmtry. Third, in the utility function, we choose to treat the source 
of funding for peacekeeping — discretionaxy or exogenous — as influencing the substi-
tutability of peacekeeping activities. 
Each country faces two kinds of constraints when choosing y,- and q{ to maximize 
utility. The first is the budget constraint, 
U = Vi + Piqh (3-9) 
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where pi is the ith. country's relative price of discretionary peacekeeping, and U is the 
zth country's income or GDP. In (3.9), the country's income is allocated between dis­
cretionary peacekeeping and all other activities, whose price is normalized to one. The 
second kind of constraint consists of the two exogenous factors — discretionary and 
nondiscretionary peacekeeping spillins. The former is held constant for the ?th country 
at the best-response level of the other n — 1 cotmtries, and the latter is just treated as 
a constant. 
When the utility fxmction (3.8) is maximized subject to the budget constraint (3.9) 
eind to the exogeneity of Qi ajid the first-order condition can be solved implicitly to 
obtain the peacekeeping contribution fxmction, 
qi = max{qi{Ii,Qi,Q^,Pi,Ei),Q}. (i = l,...,n) (3.10) 
If a country provides a positive contribution to peacekeeping, then qi(») applies to (3.10), 
otherwise qi = 0. Since the sample countries are the primary contributors to peacekeep­
ing, we shall focus on the interior solution, where each country contributes a positive 
ajnoimt.^ A Nash equilibritun is reached when the first-order conditions associated with 
the n countries' constrained optimization problems axe satisfied simultaneously. Another 
way of characterizing this equilibrium is to require that the n contribution functions in 
(3.10) and the associated demand functions for activity y be simultaneously satisfied. 
The decision-maidng process is modeled as a Nash equilibriimi so a^ to stress the auton­
omy that countries often exercise in deciding their annual contributions to peacekeeping 
despite the UN peacekeeping assessment formula. 
Since jointly produced contributor-specific and purely public outputs, derived from 
peacekeeping, may be complementary, the coefficient on the discretionary spillin term 
in an estimated contribution function may be positive unlike the case where only a 
purely public output exists. This follows because an increase in discretionary spillins 
^This assumption holds for sJl szunple countries, except for China (1975-81), Portugal (1975, 1977), 
and Spain (1977, 1979, 1981). 
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may increase the desire for the contributor-specific benefit associated with peacekeeping 
activities. Another reason for expecting a positive coeflacient on the spillln term stems 
from the peacekeeping assessment formula. As the United Nations increases its peace­
keeping activity, it will assign its member states greater payment obligations, so that 
increased peacekeeping contributions by the other sample coimtries should be accom­
panied, to some extent, with the coimtry's own increase in peacekeeping contributions, 
even if the coxmtry does not strictly adhere to its institutionalized obligation. Because 
of the absence of nation-specific activities being associated with exogenous spillins 
the sign of its coefficient is more difficult to predict, and is dependent on the consump­
tion relationship among the goods. If is complementary with the other goods, then 
its coefficient is likely to be positive. The influence of income is invariably positive for 
public goods, but is less cleax-cut for peacekeeping, because the need for these activi­
ties is based on exogenous factors behind the number and degree of conflicts worldwide. 
When peacekeeping is required, the world may be in either recession or boom. As long 
as peacekeeping remains such a minuscule portion of GDP, most countries can meet 
their obligations even during recessionary times, thus limiting any significant relation­
ship between peacekeeping contributions and income. Since assessment shares rarely 
vary annually with a contributor's income, this is another factor that limits the influ­
ence of income. If a proxy for the price of peacekeeping could be fovmd, then its impact 
would be negative. Finally, a country's axnoimt of world trade (its sum of exports and 
imports) is used as a taste parameter, in the belief that countries with a larger stake in 
world trade axe more concerned about global stability, and are more willing to support 
peacekeeping. Therefore a positive coefficient is anticipated on the trade term in the 
contribution functions. 
Rather than Nash behavior (zero-conjectural variation), coimtries may be following 
a non-Nash matching behavior (nonzero-conjectural variation). If this were the case. 
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then If countries responded to this matching rate, then their utility function 
would be 
U' = U\yi, q{, qi + aiQi, Q^, Ei). (3-11) 
When the underlying peacekeeping contribution function is derived, it is no longer de­
pendent on Qi', the relevant contribution function is (3.10) without the discretionary 
spillin term. Therefore, a simple empirical test Ccin ascertain whether or not non-Nash 
matching behavior applies by examining the significance of the coefficient of the Qi term 
in the estimated contribution functions. 
3.3 Empirical Representation 
The econometric specification corresponding to the contribution function (3.10) is 
given by 
111 Qit — Pit + 02i hi GDPit + /?3i In S PILLit + /?4t" In Q^  + Psi In T Ru + (3-12) 
for each country, where prices have been dropped from the functions, because we have 
no information on the relative price of peacekeeping compared with all other activities. 
If the price of peacekeeping has changed in the saxne proportion as the prices of the 
other goods, then dropping price creates no biases. According to function (3.12), each 
country's discretionary peacekeeping (9) is determined by its GDP, discretionary peace­
keeping spillins {SPILL), the residual peacekeeping spending (Q^), and the country's 
trade {TR), measured by the sum of exports and imports. For all variables except 
Q^, the first subscript indicates the country, while the second denotes the time period. 
Since Q^ is the same for all countries in a given yeax, its only subscript indicates the 
countries eire simply following their peacekeeping assessments, g,- = uji(PKbudget) for z = 1, n, 
where w,- is the fth country's assessment rate, emd PKbudget is the totzd UN peacekeeping assessments. 
In this case, = 0-
' dqi 
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time period. The PkiS, k = 1,...5, represent the constaxit and the four unknown coeffi­
cients for the fth coxmtry, while fiu denotes the random, disturbance term. After trying 
both linear and log-linear specifications, we picked the latter because of its superior 
performance. The equations have different parameters f3ki for each country because of 
differences in political and economic conditions; however, the variables that influence 
the level of contributions are believed to be the same across countries. 
Since the contribution fimction (3.10) describe behavior at a Nash equilibrium, all 
countries essentially demand the same total discretionary contributions toward peace­
keeping. In essence, the determination of the SPILL variable is not independent of the 
qiS. Thus, the SPILL variable, defined as the difference between total discretionary 
contributions and individual discretionary contributions, is a random variable likely to 
be correlated with the disturbance term. An instrumental variable estimation proce­
dure, therefore, is utilized to get rid of this simultaneity bias. The SPILL variable is 
estimated as a function of all exogenous variables in the system a^ follows: 
hi S P I L L i t  = 00 + E In G D P j t  +  5 \ x i Q ^  +  f 2 ^ j ^  (3.13) 
i=i j=i 
for each coimtry where un is the disturbance term, and the other Greek symbols are 
imknown parameters. 
Equations (3.12)-(3.13) are estimated as a system of equations for each of the 25 
sample countries. Because time-series data are utilized, there is the possibility that 
adjacent disturbances are correlated. To address autocorrelation, we first fit equations 
( 3 . 1 2 ) - ( 3 . 1 3 )  a n d  t h e n  t e s t  t h e  n u l l  h y p o t h e s i s  t h a t  t h e  a u t o c o r r e l a t i o n  c o e f f i c i e n t  { p )  
is zero. If the test results warrant correcting for autocorrelation, then the estimate of p, 
p is used to transform the variables in (3.12), where the first observation is transformed 
by "v/l — /52. Equations (3.12)-(3.13) are then refitted using the two-stage least square 
method. 
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Once autocorrelation is corrected, if necessary, there are a couple of hypotheses that 
axe tested for the best empirical representation of (3.12). In particular, we test whether 
the coef&cients on the SPILL and vaxiables are the same across all sample covintries. 
An F-test is used to evaluate the null hypothesis, 
Hoi • ~ /^4i* ~ •••1 
This test indicates whether the discretionaxy" spillins ajid residual peacekeeping spending 
axe perfect substitutes. Since the 25 sample countries are diverse according to income 
levels, stages of development, and other political economic factors, the coefficients on 
the GDP and TR vaxiables axe aoiticipated to vary across countries. However, some 
coimtries may display similax responses to SPILL and depending on their role in 
UN peacekeeping operations. A logistical means for grouping countries so as to test 
the equivalence of these coefficients across countries is to rely on the countries' UN 
peacekeeping assessment scale vis-a-vis their regular budget assessment scale. Coun­
tries with similax UN assessment ratios have either identical free-riding incentives or else 
analogous peacekeeping responsibilities vis-a-vis the United Nations. Three groups are 
germane: (1) Security Council permanent members, whose UN assessment ratio (de­
noted by UNR) between peacekeeping and the regular budget exceeds one; (2) Group B 
countries, whose UNR equals one; and (3) Group C countries, whose UNR is less than 
one. For SPILL, we test 
Ho2 : Pzi = fizj {i 7^ j) 
for various subgroupings of countries. When coefficients across countries in a subgroup 
axe not statistically different, then we can impose equality restrictions on these coef­
ficients, and reduce the number of coefficients to be estimated, thereby increasing the 
efficiency of the estimators. 
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3.4 Sample and Data 
The sample consists of tlie current sixteen NATO member states and the following 
nine additional countries: Australia, Japan, Sweden, Austria, China, Finland, Iceland, 
New Zealand, and an augmented Russian Federation (henceforth called Russia), which 
consists of the USSR for 1975-91 and the combination of Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus 
for 1992-96.'* Data for these three countries axe combined after 1991, so that we caji 
splice together a proxy coimtry that closely corresponds to the earlier peacekeeping 
contributor, the USSR.® The end to the Cold War also poses a problem for putting 
together a consistent time series for Germajny. To accomplish this goal, we use data 
for West Germany for 1975-89 and imified Germany for 1990-96. For 1975-85, the 
25 country sample's annual share of discretionary peacekeeping contributions averaged 
96.5 percent; for 1986-96, the sample's axmual share of these contributions averaged 96.1 
percent. Even though the sample includes less than 15 percent of UN members, it still 
accoxmts for almost all of the discretionary contributions to peacekeeping. 
As in Chapter 2, the data on discretionary peacekeeping contributions (PK) in cur­
rent year dollars come from two sources. Annual data for 1975—96 on the actual con­
tributions made to aU special assessment accoimts by each sample country are drawn 
from the UN (1976—97) Status of Contributions^ and the data for 1975-96 on the volim-
taxy contributions to the UNFICYP account are from the biennial UN (various years) 
Financial Report. For each sample country, these two contributions axe then summed 
to yield PK in current doUax terms. Constant dollar PK figures axe derived by applying 
the appropriate price deflators® For the zth country in year t, SPILLu consists of the 
''Although we use the term, sample to describe the set of countries selected for the regression analysis, 
this sample is by no means a random sample of the UN member states. 
® Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus were the only ex-Soviet republics that contributed to peacekeeping 
during 1992-96. 
®US GDP deflators with a baise yeax of 1987 are used. The deflators for 1975-93 are talcen from 
World Bank (1995), while the deflators for 1994-96 come from adjusting US GDP deflators with a 
base year of 1990, given by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) (1997c) International Financial 
Statistics, September. 
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sum of the real PK figures for the other 24 sample countries during year t. GDP figures 
at market prices in current US dollajs are drawn from the World Bank (1995) World 
Data 1995 for 1975-93, and from the World Bank (1997) World Development Indicators 
1997 for 1994-957 GDP for 1996 axe estimated by applying the 1992-95 annual growth 
rate to 1995 GDP for all sample covmtries. 
To obtain residual peacekeeping spending (Q^) for the sample countries, we first 
need total aanual UN peacekeeping spending for 1975-96. These figures are estimated 
from expenditures listed for each peacekeeping mission in the UN (various yeaxs) Fi­
nancial Report. For each mandate period, peacekeeping spending is apportioned to the 
appropriate calendar year, since these mandate periods vary among missions and do not 
coincide with a calendar yeax.® From each year's total peacekeeping spending, we deduct 
the sample coxmtries' actual contributions to the special assessment accoimts and the 
UNFICYP accoimt to arrive at the annual figure. As in the case of discretionary 
peacekeeping contributions, GDP and axe converted to constant 1987 US dollars by 
applying the requisite US GDP deflators. 
Countries' trade figures { T R )  for 1975-95 are derived from import and export figures 
listed in UN (1987, 1989, and 1996b) International Trade Statistics Yearbook.^ The 1996 
figures are derived from import and export figures listed in IMF (1997b) International 
^The 1990 figure for unified Germany is taken from the UN (1996a) Statistical Yearbook 1994- The 
1975-86 figures for the USSR are estimated (backcasted) by using the annual growth rate for the USSR 
during 1987-90. 
®For instance, one-sixth of the expenditure for the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) during 
its mandate period (August 1, 1987 to Januaury 31, 1988) is assigned to 1988, and the rest to 1987. 
® Belgium trade figures are derived by subtracting Luxembourg figures from Belgium-Luxembourg 
figures. For Russia (1992-95) and Luxembourg (1975-92), the figures are calculated from data in IMF 
(1996) International Financial Statistics Yearbook. For Austria (1995), Belgium-Luxembourg (1995), 
and Luxembourg (1993-95), the figures Eire calculated from data in IMF (1997b). For Sweden (1996), 
the figure is calculated from data in IMF (1997c). The figures are estimated for Austria (1996), Belgium 
(1986-88), Luxembourg (1986-88), Greece (1995-96), the USSR (1991), and augmented Russia (1996). 
We calculate the average of four years — two years before and after the missing data point ajid use 
this average for the missing value. When two or more consecutive data points are missing, the first 
missing value is estimated based on the average czJculated value for the previous four years, ajid then 
this estimated vaJue is used to get the next missing value and so on. For augmented Russia (1996), the 
growth rate for 1994-95 is used because earlier years are not representative. 
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Financial Statistics, April. All trade figures are in constant 1987 US doUaxs to coincide 
with the constant dollax representations of the other vaxiables. 
Ideally, we intend to use the UN assessment ratios {UNRs) as a proxy for the relative 
price of peacekeeping. Unfortimately, UNRs show virtually no variation over time, so 
that they cannot be used in the time-series regressions. They, however, identify pooling 
restrictions from which to derive restricted models. 
3.5 Estimation Results 
Based on equations (3.12)-(3.13), we use the two-stage least square method to es­
timate peacekeeping contribution functions for each of the 25 sample countries during 
1975—96. Since there is evidence of autocorrelation in some of the estimated equations 
of the sample countries, we correct this autocorrelation for any country's equation if the 
Durbin-Watson statistic either indicates autocorrelation or is in the uncertain range. 
These estimates axe displayed in Table 3.1 for each sample country. As expected, 
GDP is typically not a significaiit determinant of a country's peacekeeping contributions. 
Canada, Spain, axid the United States display a negative and significant income response 
at the .05 level, while Finland shows a negative and significant income response at the 
.10 level. For some countries, the increase in peacekeeping contributions, necessitated 
by a greater need for peacekeeping activities at the staxt of the 1990s, happened to 
coincide with a recessionaxy period. Also, the strong negative coefficient observed for 
the United States could be at least partially explained by the fact that the Reagan 
administration substajitially reduced its financial support for the United Nations based 
on the advice given by conservative think-tanks such as the Heritage Foundation, during 
the US economic boom of the 1980s. All other GDP coefficients axe insignificant at the 
.10 level. 
The most important determinant of the contribution to discretionary peacekeeping 
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Table 3.1 Autocorrelation-corrected two-stage least 
squaxe estimates of UN peacekeeping 
contribution functions: 1975-96 
Country 
Regressors 
Constaint In GDP \ii SPILL InQ" InTR 
Belgium 0.825 0.106 1.135"" -0.062 -0.578 
(0.12) (0.22) (3.38) (-0.48) (-1.07) 
Canada+ 6.228 -1.043"" 0.895"" 0.183"" 0J301" 
(1.32) (-2.27) (12.88) (2.55) (1.90) 
Denmark-t- -1.849 -0.067 0.999"" 0.058 -0.228 
(-0.72) (-0.23) (9S7) (0.59) (-1.01) 
France-t- -3.710 -0.324 0.908"" 0.054 0.475" 
(-0.75) (-0.73) (6.29) (0.46) (1.73) 
Germany-(- -0.669 -0.033 1.025"" 0.103 -0.132 
(-0.22) (-0.10) (9.76) (1.07) (-0.52) 
Greece-(- -1.850 -0.009 0.153 0.149 0.058 
(-0.55) (-0.03) (1.55) (1.53) (0.49) 
Iceland -3.728 -0.906 0.936"" -0.058 0.515 
(-1.19) (-1.61) (6.86) (-0.34) (136) 
Italy+ -1.093 -0.239 1.113"" 0.002 0.040 
(-0J0) (-0.49) (8.46) (0.02) (0.11) 
Luxembourg -7.092"* -0.239 1.078"" 0.087 0.108 
(-4.81) (-0.99) (9-21) (0.89) (0.51) 
Netherlands -3.783 -0.066 0.875"" 0.175" 0.041 
(-1.17) (-0.25) (7J3) (1.64) (0.19) 
Norway+ -4.052 0.602 0S13"" 0.004 -0.662"" 
(-1.21) (1.32) (12.07) (0.06) (-2.67) 
PortugsJ-t- -0.64 -3.935 1.359 1.238 2.579 
(-0.02) (-0.89) (0.78) (0.82) (1.16) 
Spain-(- 11.821 -9.872"" 0.240 0.285 9.628"* 
(0.47) (-3.83) (0.22) (0.36) (6.52) 
Turkey-t- 0.277 -1.310 0.932" -0.158 0.819"" 
(0.03) (-1.42) (1.76) (-0.47) (2.18) 
United Kingdoms- 0.096 -0.246 0.943"" 0.105" 0.044 
(0.04) (-0.96) (15.42) (1.80) (0.28) 
United States-i- 64.703"'"" -5.147"" 1.108"" 0.267"" 0.853 
(2.81) (-2.57) (7.29) (2.20) (139) 
Australia -0.322 -0.255 0.961"" 0.070 -0.059 
(-0.06) (-0.49) (10.29) (0.75) (-031) 
Japan+ -4.241"' -0.149 1.082"" 0.011 0.299"" 
(-3.16) (-0.91) (19.22) (0.28) (2.40) 
Sweden+ 0.343 -0.107 1.029"" -0.031 -0.295" 
(0.15) (-0.45) (12.79) (-0.35) (-1.65) 
Russia-(- 8.835 -1.274 1.573 -3.685" 1.543 
(0.18) (-0.35) (1.05) (-1.66) (0.46) 
Austria-f- -4.487 -0.058 1.136"" -0.185 0.047 
(-1.28) (-0.13) (7.85) (-1.36) (0.18) 
China-h -51.002 -1.787 -0.819 -0.028 6.861"* 
(-0.88) (-0.32) (-0.51) (-0.02) (331) 
Finland -1.187 -0.781" 1.161"* -0.181 0.452 
(-0.43) (-1.85) (9.62) (-1.41) (1.40) 
Ireland+ -7.693"" -0.084 0.978"* 0.055 0.209 
(-5.19) (-0.54) (7.07) (0.43) (1.08) 
New Zealand -9.393 0.124 0.889"" 0.150 0.225 
(-1.27) (0.14) (3.76) (0.71) (0.47) 
Numbers in parentheses are t-values. 
" indicates significantly different from zero at the .10 level for a two-tailed 
test. 
*"• indicates significantly different from zero at the .05 level for a two-tailed 
test. 
-f- indicates data corrected for autocorrelation. 
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is the discretionaxy spillin variable, shown in Table 3.1. For 19 out of 25 sample 
countries, the SPILL coefficients are positive and significant at the .05 level, and for 1 
c o u n t r y  i t  i s  p o s i t i v e  a n d  s i g n i f i c a n t  a t  t h e  . 1 0  l e v e l .  F o r  t h e s e  c o u n t r i e s ,  t h e  S P I L L  
coefficients vary from 0.875 (the Netherlands) to 1.161 (Finland). If countries displayed 
no discretion whatsoever and always paid their peacekeeping cissessments, then their 
SPILL coefficients should be one, indicating that a 10 percent increase in everyone 
else's contributions is accompanied with a 10 percent increase in the country's own con­
tributions.^® The strong positive showing for the SPILL coefficient is also indicative of 
a complementarity between the jointly produced contributor-specific and public bene­
fits derived from discretionaxy peacekeeping contributions. If countries are following a 
non-Nash matching behavior, their SPILL coefficients should be 0. The high t-vaiues 
found for the SPILL coefficients imply that this alternative characterization does not 
apply. 
The residual peacekeeping spending, Q^, axe a positive and significant influence on 
discretionary peacekeeping contributions for Canada (.05 level), the Netherlands (.10 
level), the United Kingdom (.10 level), and the United States (.05 level), and a negative 
and significant influence for just Russia (.10 level). It appeaxs that SPILL and 
do not possess similar estimated coefficients, which is confirmed by aji F-test on the 
equality of axid /?4 for the full sample. The F-statistic is 23.906 with a prob value of 
0.0001. For all countries except Russia, discretionary peacekeeping contributions show 
a very small (typically positive) response to in Table 3.1. 
In the right-most column of Table 3.1, the coefficients of the trade variable are 
^°If jJl SEimple countries always pay their peacekeeping assessments, for any assessment rate (w,-) for 
the ith country, 
51ng.- _ dqi Qi _ aPK^dget Qi _ G7.- {1 - :ui){PKbudget) _ ^ 
d h i Q i ~  d Q i  q i  ~  ~  J ^ i i P K b - u d g e t )  
Or'K.OXiagct 
where PKbudget is the totcil UN peacekeeping assessments. 
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listed and provide some support for the hypothesis that countries with greater trading 
interests axe more supportive of peacekeeping. Six countries — Canada, France, Spain, 
Turkey, Japan, China — have positive and significant TR coefficients at the .10 level or 
better. This coefficient for the United States and Finland is also positive and not too far 
from the .10 significance level. Only Norway and Sweden have negative and significant 
coefficients. 
In Table 3.2, we report the results for the F-tests of the equality of the S P I L L  
coefficient, /?3, for five different groups of contributors, based on the value of the UN 
a s s e s s m e n t  r a t i o .  F o r  t h e  f u l l  s a m p l e ,  w e  c a n  r e j e c t  t h e  n i d i  h y p o t h e s i s  t h a t  t h e  S P I L L  
Table 3.2 F-test on equality of S P I L L  coefficient over various sub­
groups 
(5% significance level) 
Sample Critical 
Group of countries F-value F-value Decision 
Full sample 3.735 1.52 Reject H Q  
Security Council 0.5794 3.23 Unable to 
{ U N R  >  1) reject H O  
Group B coimtries with /?3 < 1 ^ 0.288 1.91 Unable to 
{ U N R  = 1) reject H Q  
Group B coimtries with /?3 > 1 ^  0.178 2.17 Unable to 
{ U N R  = 1) reject H Q  
Scandinavian ^ 1.208 2.76 Unable to 
reject Ho 
HQ : ^31 = /?3j for all j in the designated subgroup. 
1. Excludes China and Russia. 
2. Canada, Denmark, Germeiny, Icelzind, the Netherlands, Norway, Australia, 
Ireland, New Zealand. 
3. Belgium, Italy, Luxembourg, Japan, Sweden, Austria, Finland. 
4. Norway, Denmark, Sweden, Iceland 
coefficients are equal; however, we cannot reject the equality of S P I L L  coefficients for 
three of the five permanent members of the Security Council. Russia and China are 
excluded from this test, because their SPILL coefficients are insignificant. To find an 
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appropriate pooling restriction, we break the Group B countries {UNR = 1) into two 
subgroups — those with 03 < 1 and those with fiz > The first group includes 
Canada, Denmark, Germany, Iceland, the Netherlands, Norway, Australia, Ireland, and 
New Zeaiand, while the second group includes Belgium, Italy, Luxembourg, Japan, 
Sweden, Austria, and Finland- Based on these two subgroupings, we are unable to reject 
the null hypothesis that the estimated SPILL coefficients are equal among countries 
within a subgroup. The first group is fairly homogeneous with respect to five of its 
nine members by including three Scandinavian coimtries aJong with two south Pacific 
countries. We also test the equality of coefficients for the four Scandinavian countries 
— Denmark, Iceland, Norway, Sweden — and axe unable to reject the null hypothesis of 
equality of SPILL coefficients. There is no reason to test the equality of this coefficient 
for the Group C coimtries {UNR < 1), since three of their four SPILL coefficients 
are insignificant. Only Turkey had a significant SPILL coefficient among the Group C 
coimtries in the sample. 
To increase the efficiency of our estimates, we restrict the coefficients on the S P I L L  
variable to be equal within three groups of countries — three of the five permanent 
Security Council members. Group B coimtries with /Ja < 1, Group B countries with 
/3 > 1 — and reestimate the entire 25 equation system for these pooling restrictions. 
The reestimated equations for those coimtries whose coeflS.cient estimates cire affected 
by the restrictions are reported in Table 3.3, grouped according to the three sets of 
restrictions. As anticipated, the significance of the estimated coefficients increases owing 
to the pooling restrictions. Group B countries whose /?3 exceeds one, appear to have 
an extra commitment to peacekeeping and include three neutral countries (Austria, 
Finland, Sweden), Japan and others. They responded even more fuUy to increases in 
the discretionary peacekeeping contributions of other countries than did the permanent 
'^^Spain was a Group C country for most of the seunple period. It switched from Group C to Group 
B status in 1992. 
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Table 3.3 Restricted and autocorrelation-corrected 
two-stage least square estimates of UN peace­
keeping contribution functions: 1975—96 
Regressors 
Country Constant In GDP In SPILL InQ" InTH 
Security Council 
{JJNR > 1) 
France -2.562 -0.372 0.958*" 0.027 0.422" 
(-0.66) (-0.88) (18.15) (0.29) (1.79) 
United Kingdom 0.323 -0.246 0.958"* 0.095* 0.022 
(0.15) (-0 96) (18.15) (1.74) (0.14) 
United States 52.422''" -4.254«" 0.958"" 0J44** 0.784 
(2.64) (-2.34) (18.15) (3.56) (1.29) 
Group B countries 
{UNR=\,h < 1) 
Csuiada 6.228 -1.018" 0.914"" 0.169*" 0.271** 
(132) (-2.25) (27.05) (3.02) (2.13) 
Denmark -3.104 -0.037 0.914"* 0.109 -0.119 
(-1.44) (-0.13) (27.05) (1.38) (-0.62) 
Germany -2.897 -0.052 0.914"* 0.200** 0.073 
(-1.52) (-0.23) (27.05) (2.73) (0.45) 
Iceland -3.834 -0.923"' 0.914"" -0.036 0.551" 
(-1.25) (-1.66) (27.05) (-0.32) (1.78) 
Netherlands -2393 -0.091 0.914"* 0.151" -0.008 
(-1-31) (-0.36) (27.05) (1.92) (-0.06) 
Norway -3.569 0.483 0.914"" 0.031 -0.594*" 
(-1.39) (1.31) (27.05) (0.53) (-3.08) 
Australia -1.293 -0.213 0.914"" 0.103 -0.005 
(-0.26) (-0.41) (27.05) (1.46) (-0.03) 
Ireland -8.171*" -0.089 0.914"" 0.099 0.278"" 
(-7.49) (-0.58) (27.05) (1.05) (2.16) 
New Zealand -8.924 -8.924 0.914"" 0.134 0.201 
(-1.53) (-1.53) (27.05) (0.92) (0.48) 
Group B countries 
(C/NH= l.fe > 1) 
Belgium -0.052 0.132 1.084"" -0.047 -0.511" 
(-0.01) (0.30) (29.22) (-0.56) (-1.66) 
Italy -1.365 -0.256 1.084"* 0.021 0.087 
(-0J9) (-0.54) (29.22) (0.22) (0.29) 
Luxembourg -7.022*" -0.245 1.084** 0.083 0.104 
(-7.91) (-1.11) (29.22) (1.12) (0.52) 
Japan -4.194""' -0.153 1.084*" 0.010 0.298" 
(-3.83) (-0.99) (29.22) (0.27) (2.41) 
Sweden 0.742 -0.062 1.084"" -0.075 -0.389"" 
(0.34) (-0.27) (29.22) (-1.11) (-2.94) 
Austria -5.305* -0.004 1.084"* -0.151 0.079 
(-1.95) (-0.01) (29.22) (-1.49) (0.30) 
Finland -1.365 -0.893** 1.084*" -0.119 0.605"* 
(-0.49) (-2.31) (29.22) (-1.34) (2.67) 
Numbers in parentheses are t-values. 
Pooling restriction for each subgrouping involves equality of spillin coefEcient. 
" indicates significantly different from zero at the .10 level for a two-tailed 
test. 
"" indicates significantly different from zero at the .05 level for a two-tailed 
test. 
1. Security Council pooling excludes China and Russia whose In SPILL 
coefficient was not significant. 
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members of the Sectirity Council. 
Interestingly, there is a preponderajice of negative coefficients on the G D P  variable in 
Table 3.3, with significant coefficients (.10 level) displayed by just foiir sample countries 
— the United States, Canada, Iceland, and Finland. For the pooled estimates, trade is 
a significant positive determinant of peacekeeping contributions for six countries and a 
significant negative determinant for three coimtries — Norway, Belgium (.10 level) and 
Sweden. In Table 3.3, the SPILL coefficient requires little further discussion, except 
to underscore the rather high t-values owing to pooling restrictions. As before, the 
variable indicates some complementarity with discretionary peacekeeping. 
3.6 Analysis of the Estimation Results 
Insignificance of the G D P  coefficients for the most sample countries suggests that 
countries' economic fluctuations affect their peacekeeping contributions very little, unlike 
in the case of militaxy expenditures. Besides method of financing, there axe two impor­
tant differences between peacekeeping and national defense. First, the share of GDP 
devoted to peacekeeping is tiny, compared to the share of GDP devoted to national 
defense. This does not necessarily mean that countries are unconcerned with the levels 
of their peacekeeping assessments. The United States, for instance, has been demanding 
its assessment share to be reduced from current 31 percent to 25 percent. Second, the 
urgency of peacekeeping is generally greater when the Security Council (or the General 
Assembly in some cases) authorizes such an action, than the urgency of peacetime mili­
tary build-up. Postponement of an establishment of peacekeeping operation by one year 
could bring disastrous consequences, while postponement of purchase of a war-ship by 
one year during peacetime is unlikely to have significant effects on the country's national 
security. The relative inexpensiveness and the urgent nature of peacekeeping are behind 
the insignificance of the GDP coefficients. If, in the future, the United Nations is to 
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maintain laxge-scale stand-by peacekeeping forces for rapid deployments, a country's fi-
najicial contributions to such, forces would probably be dependent on fluctuations in its 
GDP. 
According to the estimation results, the key determinant of a country's peacekeeping 
contributions is the contributions from the other sample coimtries. Apparently, the 
positive and significant SPILL coefficients fotmd for 20 out of 25 sample coimtries 
indicate the absence of free-riding; coimtries seem to be responsive to the need for 
peacekeeping. However, what truly matters to the United Nations is how responsive 
these countries are. In other words, the success of UN peacekeeping operations depends, 
at least partially, on how closely the member states comply with their assessments. The 
positive and significant SPILL coefficients would be observed even when every sample 
country contributes only 50 percent of its assessments throughout the sample period. 
In such a case, however, most peacekeeping operations are likely to fail due to insufficient 
funding. Nevertheless, the closeness of the SPILL coefficients to one is indicative of the 
importance of the assessment shares. 
The exogenous peacekeeping spillin {Q^) could be decomposed into three parts: the 
expenditures on the regular-budget-financed peacekeeping operations, the contributions 
from the non-sample coimtries to the special assessment accounts, and the difference 
between the UN expenditures on the special-assessment-account-financed peacekeeping 
operations and the total contributions to the special assessment accounts. The possible 
reason why SPILL and do not possess similar estimated coefficients is that the 
correlations between q,- and the two components of Q^, namely the first and the third, 
a x e  d i f f e r e n t  f r o m  t h e  c o r r e l a t i o n  b e t w e e n  g ,  a n d  S P I L L .  F i r s t ,  w h i l e  S P I L L  a n d  q i  
this case, the spillin coefficients would be still one, since 
_ aPK^dget Qi _ -Sai .5(1 - g7.)(PA'6mfge<) _ ^ 
dlnQi ~ dQi H ~ ^ H .5(1-C7,-) .5izri{PKbudget) 
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finajice the saxne set of operations, the first component of and q,- finance different 
set of operations. Therefore, the correlation between SPILL ajid qi is likely to differ 
from the correlation between the first component of and g,-. Second, although both 
SPILL and the third component of finance the same set of peacekeeping operations, 
SPILL is assessed contributions, while the third component of is not. As mentioned 
earlier, as long as countries respond to the change in their peacekeeping assessments 
at least to some degree, qi and SPILL axe likely to be positively correlated. Since 
the third component of is not assessed contributions but the residuai peacekeeping 
expenditures of the United Nations, the correlation between this component of and 
qi is likely to differ firom the correlation between SPILL and g,-. 
The TR coeflEicients were significant and positive for six coimtries, significant and 
negative for two coimtries, and insignificant for seventeen other coimtries. The insignif­
icance of the coefficients for the majority of the sample countries could be explained by 
two factors: unimportance of the conflict areas as a country's trade partners, and the 
impact of a regional conflict on a country's trade with the region. First, with a major 
exception of the Middle East, many of the regions which require peacekeeping have very 
limited amounts of trade with the sample coimtries (e.g. Angola, Cambodia, the former 
Yugoslavia, Haiti, Rwanda, Somalia). Second, when a conflict area is a coimtry's trade 
paxtner, the coimtry's amoimt of trade with the region is likely to decrease as the conflict 
intensifies, and is likely to increase as the regional peace is established. In such a case, 
the country's trade with the region would be negatively correlated with the level of UN 
peacekeeping effort in the region. 
3.7 Concluding Remarks 
In this chapter, a reduced-form UN peacekeeping contribution fimction was derived 
using a joint-product approach. The function was estimated with the two-stage least 
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squaxe method, for each of the 25 saxaple cotmtries for the period of 1975—96. Al­
though the approach used here is common in the military expenditure literature, the 
estimation results foimd for peacekeeping contributions axe quite different from the ones 
typically foimd for defense expenditures; a coimtry's peacekeeping contributions react 
strongly and positively to spiUins, and very little to the country's income fluctuations. 
Assessment-based finaxicing, the insignificajice of the share of national income devoted 
to peacekeeping, ajid the urgency of peacekeeping axe likely to be the determinants of 
such findings. 
Peacekeeping often requires quick response to the changing nature of a conflict; a 
change in the timing of troop deployment by a few months could mean a difference 
between success and failure of the entire operation. In this sense, peacekeeping is more 
compaxable to fighting small-scale wars axoimd the globe than peacetime military build­
up of allied countries. Due to this urgent nature of peacekeeping, once an assessment 
letter from the General Assembly is received, a country is required to pay the assessed 
axaount within 30 days. Although a coxmtry's peacekeeping assessments remain a mi­
nuscule portion of its national income, prompt payment of the amount due seems to be 
a difficult task for many countries. In this chapter, we focused our study on the amount 
of peacekeeping contributions. The •promptness of contributions should also be studied 
in the future. 
Despite the absence of effective sanctions against nonpayment, assessment shaxes 
seem to be an importaxit determinant of countries' peacekeeping contributions. In order 
to improve the estimation fmrther, a country's assessments should be explicitly included 
in the model. This will be the topic of the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 4 EFFECTS OF UN PEACEKEEPING 
SPECIAL ASSESSMENTS 
4.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter, a reduced-form UN peacekeeping financial contribution func­
tion was derived using a joint-product approach, and then estimated for each of the 25 
sample countries, using the two-stage least square method. From the estimation results, 
it is clear that the assessments are an important determinant of actual peacekeeping 
contributions, despite the fact that there are no effective sanctions against nonpayment. 
The purpose of this chapter is to incorporate the assessments into a peacekeeping con­
tribution function, and to explore the possibility of increasing a UN member state's 
incentive to contribute by adjusting its assessment for each peacekeeping operation. 
Following a discussion of the basics of UN peacekeeping special assessment system, 
we study the effectiveness of the system empirically through observing the change in 
the patterns of member states' financial contributions to UNFICYP, which had been fi­
nanced solely by voluntary contributions until 1992, and since then, financed mainly by 
special assessments. The ntmiber of contributing countries and the amount contributed 
by each country have changed considerably with the creation of UNFICYP special as­
sessment account in 1992. A possible explanation for these changes is presented, and 
based on the hypothesis, assessments are incorporated into a member state's utility 
function. Derived financial contribution curves for an individual peacekeeping operation 
and equilibrivun levels of contributions axe graphically illustrated. It is argued that the 
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existence of assessments will shift up a downward sloping contribution curve, and create 
a contribution-ceiling , beyond which a coimtry is imlikely to contribute. 
As discussed in Chapter 1, the valuation of public benefits created by a peacekeeping 
operation is likely to vary across coimtries depending on the location and the nature 
of the operation. Using a two-state, two-peacekeeping operation model, we examine 
whether the United Nations could increase total peacekeeping contributions to each 
operation by adjusting the assessments according to each member state's valuation of 
peacekeeping public benefits. 
4.2 Development of UN Peacekeeping Financing 
The term, peacekeeping does not appear anywhere in the UN Charter. Neither do the 
rtiles on the financing of peacekeeping. As Hill and Malik (1996) point out, peacekeep­
ing developed during the Cold War period as a tool which prevents the two superpowers 
from getting involved directly in regional conflicts. The financing methods of peace­
keeping also developed during the same period. The first three peacekeeping operations, 
UNSCOB (1947-52), UNTSO (1948 to date), and UNMOGIP (1949 to date) are/were 
financed through the biennial UN regular budget, just like other UN activities. The 
next, larger-scale operation, UNEF I (1956-67) as well as ONUC (1960-64) were fi­
nanced through assessment accoimts. Although these assessment accounts were set up 
separately from the regular budget, member states were assessed based on the regular 
budget assessment scale with small adjustments. Due to withholding of payment to the 
UNEF I and ONUC accoimts by some member states, the United Nations found itself in 
serious financial crisis. In order to cover the short-falls, S169 million of bonds were issued 
in 1962. Also, the next two operations, UNSF/UNTEA (1962-63) and UNYOM (1963--
64) were financed solely by countries most directly involved, and UNFICYP (1964 to 
date) had been financed through voluntary contributions. After financing the next two 
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small-scale observer missions, DOMREP (1965-66) and UNIPOM (1965-66) through 
the regular budget, the United Nations established a special assessment account in or­
der to finance UNEF II (1973-79). AU the following peacekeeping operations except for 
UNGOMAP (1988-90) have been financed through similar special assessment accounts. 
4.3 Special Assessments 
The advantage of using separate special assessment accoimts rather than the UN 
regular budget is that the United Nations does not have to wait until the General 
Assembly approves the next biennial regular budget to request member states the fund 
for newly established operations and for imexpected expansions of ongoing operations. 
This is crucial because only a very limited axnoimt of cash reserve is currently available for 
peacekeeping. As the Independent Advisory Group on UN Financing (1993) points out, 
the disadvantage of separate special assessment accounts is that it is difficult for member 
states to respond promptly to assessment requests since they receive the assessment 
letters through out their budgetary cycles. If the United Nations is to decrease the 
frequency of assessment requests, the UN Peacekeeping Reserve Fund must be increased 
substantially. If the cxirrent assessment system is to be maintained, each member state 
should create a cash reserve of its own. 
The special assessment scale assigns approximately 97 percent of the total assess­
ments to less than 30 member states which belong to Group A and Group B (see Chap­
ter 1). Furthermore, approximately 80 percent of the total assessments is assigned to 
the seven wealthiest member states. 
Since the very first peacekeeping assessment account was established for UNEF I, 
the United Nations has been suffering firom undercontributions by its member states. 
Table 4.2 shows the peacekeeping arrears for each year during 1980-96. The arrears 
stayed relatively constant during the 1980s, the average being $275.9 millions. As the 
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Table 4.1 UN peacekeeping assessment 
shaxes: 1996 
Member state Assessment (%) 
United States 31 
Japan 15 
Germany 9 
France 8 
United Kingdom 7 
Russia 6 
Italy 5 
Oanada 3 
Spain 2 
176 others 14 
Total 100 
SOURCE: United Nations (1997), Status of Con­
tributions as at December 1996. 
Table 4.2 UN peacekeeping ax-
rears: 1980-96 
(in millions of US dollars) 
Year Arrears 
1980 260.8 
1981 214.0 
1982 208.4 
1983 291.6 
1984 323.5 
1985 262.1 
1986 312.3 
1987 363.0 
1988 355.2 
1989 444.2 
1990 346.2 
1991 357.8 
1992 664.3 
1993 992.8 
1994 1,286.4 
1995 1,723.9 
1996 1,633.0 
1997 1,574.1 
1998 1,593.9 
SOURCE: Global Policy Forum, Internet 
Site, littp://www.globaIpolicy.org. 
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Cold Wax ended, and the special assessments increased in the first half of the 1990s, the 
arreeirs also increased from $346.2 millions in 1990 to S1723.9 millions in 1995. 
The only sanction against nonpayment of assessed contributions is Article 19 of the 
UN Charter, which states that "a Member of the United Nations which is in arrears 
in the payment of its financial contributions to the Organization shall have no vote 
in the General Assembly if the amount of its arrears equals or exceeds the amoimt 
of the contributions due from it for the preceding two full years." In order to avoid 
the application of Article 19, a member state simply needs to keep its arrears below 
the amount it was assessed for the preceding two years. For instance, although the 
United States owes nearly $1.7 biUion ($620 miUion for the regular budget and slightly 
more than $1 billion for peacekeeping and tribunals) as of February 1999, it needs to 
contribute only $250 million by the end of 1999 in order to avoid losing its General 
Assembly vote in 2000. The United States avoided losing its General Assembly vote in 
1999 by contributing the minimimi required amount of approximately $350 million by 
the end of 1998, reducing its arrears from approximately $1.7 billion (February 1998) to 
$1.3 billion (December 1998). The United Nations does not have the authority to charge 
interest on late payment. Moreover, even if the United States (or any other permanent 
member of the Secxirity Council) loses its vote in the General Assembly under Article 
19, it would still have a veto power in the Security Council. 
As of March 1999, there are 37 member states without their vote in the General 
Assembly^. The application of Article 19 is not automatic, however; the United Nations 
has occasionally chosen not to impose the sanction. For instance, in the early 1960s, 
dissatisfied with the handling of the Congo crisis by ONUC, the Soviet Union and France 
^They are Afghsmistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Burundi, Cambodia, Cape Verde, Central African 
Republic, Congo, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Dominica, Ecuador, Equatorial Guinea, Gam­
bia, Georgia, Grenada, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Honduras, Iraq, Kyrgyzstan, Liberia, Maurita­
nia, Mongolia, Nicaragua, Niger, Republic of Moldova, Rwanda, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, 
Sao Tome and Principe, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Someilia, Togo, Turkmenistan, Vanuatu, Yemen, 
and Yugoslavia (United Nations Office of the Spokesmaui for the Secretjiry-General, Internet site, 
http://www.un.org/News/ossg/.) 
78 
refused to pay their assessed contributions. When the Soviet Union accumulated the 
equivalent of two yeaxs' arrearages, the General Assembly avoided the application of 
Article 19 by proceeding for two sessions without any vote. As Fetherston (1994) points 
out, "had there been such a vote, the Soviet Union would probably have left the UN, 
along with its satellite states and other sympathetic states." 
4.4 Effectiveness of Special Assessment System 
As we can see from the arrears accumulated by member states, the special assess­
ment system combined with Article 19 does not provide all member states with enough 
incentives to make timely payments of full assessed contributions. This does not neces­
sarily mean complete ineffectiveness of the special assessment system, however. Table 
4.3 shows the monthly arrears of selected member states for 1998. Canada and the 
United Kingdom accumulated only a very small arrears throughout the year, and en­
tered 1999 without arrears for both peacekeeping special assessment accounts and the 
regular budget. Others, with an exception of the United States, also kept their arrears 
well below the Article 19 limit. 
One way of showing the effectiveness of special assessment system is to compare 
member states' contribution patterns imder the assessment system to the patterns under 
volimtary contribution system. Since its inception in 1964, UNFICYP had been financed 
solely by voluntary contributions until 1992. It is the only peacekeeping operation for 
which a voluntary contributions were used as a primary financial source. As Mills (1990) 
states, "the difficulties inherent in ensuring continued operations on such an uncertain 
financial basis are, with the benefit of experience, now so widely understood that this 
type of approach is xmlikely to be used another time." No more than 35 countries 
contributed to the UNFICYP voluntary contribution account in any biennial period 
during 1975-91, and the United Nations had fallen ten years behind in reimbursing troop-
Table 4.3 Monthly peacekeeping (PK) and regular budget (Reg) arrears: 1998 
(in millions of US dollars) 
Country Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec 
United States PK 940 1,004 958 958 966 966 943 1,041 1,073 961 978 976 
Reg 671 671 619 619 569 569 569 569 563 513 316 316 
Japan PK 89 137 14 14 19 19 19 89 107 97 98 98 
Reg 189 189 142 142 142 142 142 142 0 0 0 0 
Germany PK 10 36 10 10 10 10 10 47 20 10 15 9 
Reg 51 51 51 51 51 51 0 0 0 0 0 0 
France PK 9 28 22 22 23 22 2 28 36 21 24 5 
Reg 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Italy PK 5 20 20 20 7 7 5 21 22 22 9 3 
Reg 57 57 57 57 57 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
United Kingdom PK 0 17 0 0 2 0 0 19 6 0 3 0 
Reg 27 27 27 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Russia PK 136 146 128 128 129 129 129 139 125 124 126 126 
Reg 28 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Canada PK 0 8 0 0 0 0 0 9 3 0 1 0 
Reg 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Spain PK 0 7 7 7 1 1 0 8 11 11 4 4 
Reg 27 27 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
SOURCE; Global Policy Forum, Internet Site, http://www.globalpolicy.org. 
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contributing countries, losing their support as a resiilt (Jajnes 1995). In order to improve 
the situation, the UNFICYP special eissessment account was set up with the Security 
Council Resolution 831 of May 1993, and the phase out of the voluntary contribution 
account was began. While 33 member states plus Switzerland voluntarily contributed 
during the 1990-91 period, 81 member states contributed through the special assessment 
accoimt in 1994.^ Considering the fact that the situation in Cyprus has chcinged very 
Table 4.4 Number of countries which finan­
cially contributed towaxds UNFI­
CYP: 1976-96 
Year Contributing countries 
1976-77 34 
1978-79 34 
1980-81 34 
1982-83 32 
1984-85 35 
1986-87 32 
1988-89 34 
1990-91 34 
1992-93 55 
1994 82 
1995 93 
1996 98 
SOURCES: United Nations (1994-97), Status of Con­
tributions. United Nations (various years), Financial 
Report. 
little since the invasion by Turkey in 1974, it is safe to assume that this increase in 
the number of contributors is due to the establishment of special assessment account. 
Although the total amoimt contributed in each year did not change very much since 
1993, there was a noticeable change in the distribution of contributions across member 
states. The change was in general accordance with the assessment scale. For instance, 
Japan, France and Canada have increased their aimual contributions substantially, while 
the United Kingdom has done quite the opposite. Germany, France, and the United 
^Switzerlzmd continued to contribute through the voluntary contribution account. 
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Kingdom have contributed their annual assessments in full every year since 1993. 
If keeping the General Assembly vote is the only incentive for a member state to 
comply with assessments, the covmtry is likely to accimiulate arrears, and maintain 
them slightly under the Article 19 limit. Currently, the United States is the only major 
contributor showing such a behavior. Member states which accumulate no arrears, or 
maintain relatively low arrears, ajid contribute more under the special assessment system 
must have extra incentives to contribute. In other words, it must be the case that the 
special assessment system increases contributor-specific benefits or undercontributor-
specific damages of member states, even without sanctions. 
From not volimtaxily contributing towards the peacekeeping operation in Cyprus, 
Japan might suffer some damages in its relationship with Eturopean countries and the 
United States, although the stabiUty of Cyprus has very little direct influence on Japan. 
The damages would become larger if there axe formal assessments, and Japan refuses to 
comply. 
For each mandate period, a UN peacekeeping operation has target expenditures, or 
target total contributions, which are required for the level of peacekeeping activities 
unanimously approved by the General Assembly. With a special assessment system, 
each member state bears formal responsibilities of achieving this target. If Japan, un­
der contributes, the members, including Japan, immediately realize that the level of 
peacekeeping activities considered necessary by the United Nations is now unachievable 
due to Japan's undercontribution. On the other hand, with a voluntary contribution 
system, as long as Japan makes some contributions, it is difficult for the members, in­
cluding Japan, to agree on whether Japan is responsible for the United Nations not 
being able to achieve that level of peacekeeping activities. Special assessment system 
provides member states with a common yardstick; they observe how much of assessed 
amounts each country contributes, or how much of formal responsibilities each coun­
try fulfills, and it becomes easier for them to blame countries which are less willing to 
Table 4.5 Annual financial contributions towards UNFICYP by selected UN member 
states: 1976-96 
(in US dollars) 
Year United States Japan Germany France United Kingdom Italy Canada 
1976-77 12,000,000 300,000 1,000,000 0 3,276,190 580,000 0 
1978-79 6,725,000 350,000 1,000,000 0 3,105,887 487,184 0 
1980-81 8,925,000 250,000 1,040,230 0 3,836,592 200,000 0 
1982-83 11,250,000 600,000 946,133 0 3,801,087 600,000 0 
1984-85 6,747,655 400,000 839,441 0 2,320,205 400,000 0 
1986-87 8,803,153 400,000 1,424,955 0 2,467,996 700,000 0 
1988-89 8,718,000 200,000 1,586,359 0 2,109,362 457,693 0 
1990-91 6,668,650 600,000 1,678,950 170,469 2,735,788 417,259 0 
1992 10,855,000 200,000 2,144,699 88,496 2,990,814 200,000 0 
1993 10,855,000 1,256,648 2,902,600 731,621 3,528,895 200,000 263,928 
1994 5,855,879 2,699,935 1,936,582 1,643,585 1,375,141 1,294,436 674,465 
1995 6,346,340 2,828,418 1,812,622 1,590,326 1,325,436 971,191 622,454 
1996 2,810,875 1,676,792 1,989,393 1,740,238 1,444,212 564,634 682,565 
SOURCES: United Nations (1994-97), Status of Contributions. United Nations (various years). Financial Report. 
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contribute. As a result, xmdercontributor-specific damages increase, and eacii member 
state's incentives to contribute increase. 
Ceteris paribus, these assessment effects are likely to be stronger for a group with 
smaller membership size. Although the United Nations consists of 185 coimtries as of 
1999, the seven wealthiest member states finance nearly 80 percent of the UN peacekeep­
ing budget, as mentioned earlier. This highly skewed assessment scale allows them to 
ignore the tiny financial responsibiUties imposed on each of the other 178 coimtries, and 
to interact with each other as if the membership size of the United Nations is eight: the 
seven wealthiest countries plus the others combined. For instance, the criticism against 
the United States which has accumulated arrears close to its Article 19 limit is much 
stronger than the criticism against each of the smaller member states whose arrears has 
already exceeded their Article 19 limits. This is simply due to the enormous difference 
in the sizes of their arrears, which stems from the highly skewed assessment scale. 
4.5 Theoretical Models 
In the previous chapter, a member state's contribution function was derived for the 
entire UN peacekeeping activities. Here, instead, a country's contribution to each peace­
keeping operation is studied. For simplicity, it is assumed that peacekeeping activities 
itself creates only purely public benefits. Also, the residual peacekeeping expenditures 
coming from the UN regular budget and taste-shifting parameter are ignored in order 
to focus on the effects of special assessment system on member states' contributions. 
Two different models are presented in the order of increasing complexity. In Model 
1, we consider a single member state's contribution to a single peacekeeping operation. 
With this model, the basic effects of special assessments on a country's contribution is 
analyzed. In Model 2, we consider two member states' contributions to two peacekeeping 
operations. With this model, we explore the possibility of increasing total contributions 
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to each operation by adjusting each member state's assessments, while holding its total 
assessments constant. In the both models, each country is represented by its central 
government, which maximizes its utility by allocating its revenue between peacekeeping 
and all other activities. 
4.5.1 Model 1 
Consider a UN member state i, whose utility depends on the level of nation-specific 
non-peacekeeping activities (y,) and the level of a peacekeeping operation (C). In this 
model, the United Nation is asstimed to conduct only a single peacekeeping operation. 
The operation is financed by voluntary contributions from n member states, including 
i. Coimtry i faces a budget constraint, 
Ri = yi + Ci, (4.1) 
where Ri is the revenue of its central government, and c,- is its contribution to the 
operation. The prices of y,- and c,- are assumed to be one. Country i maximizes its 
utility fimction, 
U' = U\yi,C), (4.2) 
with respect to (4.1). (4.2) is increasing and strictly concave in its both arguments. 
Since the operation is financed by n countries, 
C = c. + f;c,.. (4.3) 
Cj is held constant for country i at the best-response level of the other ra — 1 
countries. From the first-order conditions of country i, we obtain 
au' 
#; = 1- (4-4) 
dyi 
Coimtry i's peacekeeping contribution curve is illustrated in Figure 4.1. The height 
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Figure 4.1 Country Cs contribution curve (with no assessment) 
au' 
of the contribution curve is which is a decreasing function of c,-. At the utility 
ay,  
maximizing contribution level, c*, (4.4) is satisfied. 
Until 1992, the maximum contributions made voluntarily by Japan for UNFICYP was 
$600,000 per year (the 1990-91 two-year period). After the creation of the UNFICYP 
special assessment account, Japan was assessed $2,699,935 in 1994 and $2,828,418 in 
1995, and contributed the full amount by the end of each year (See Table 4.5). If Japan 
decides the amount of its contributions by equating the marginal benefit of contributions 
to the marginal cost ($1), the marginal benefit of $600,000 contribution in 1994 ajid 1995 
must have been much higher than the marginal benefit of $600,000 contribution ($1) in 
the 1990-91 period, and it is likely that this was mainly due to the newly created special 
assessment account. 
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Going back to the model, let us suppose that the United Nations switches the financ­
ing method of operation C from voluntary contributions to special assessments imposed 
on n member states. With this change, now country z's utility depends not only on yi 
and C, but also on its assessment (c,) and contribution (c,) in the form of an assessment 
effect function^ 
a ' =  a ' { c { , c i ) ,  ( 4 . 5 )  
when ^  >  C f .  a '  i s  increasing in and decreasing in c,-. The utility function of country 
i becomes 
£/•' = C, Ci)) when C{ > c,-, (4.6) 
=  U ^ { y i , C )  w h e n  C i  <  C i .  
(4.6) is non-increasing in a' (and c,-), and increasing and strictly concave in j/f, C and 
Ci. By introducing a'(c,-, c,) into the utility function, we axe able to see the effects of 
contributor-specific benefits (or imdercontributor-specific damages) associated with the 
creation of special assessment system. When Ci > Ci, country i maximizes (4.6) subject 
to its budget constraint (4.1) and a contribution ceiling, Ci > Ci. The Lagrangian function 
becomes 
Li = U\yi, C, q:'(c{, Ci)) -t- \i[Ri — yi — c,] -1- fj.i[ci ~ c,]. (4.7) 
From the first-order conditions, we obtain 
9C/' dU' da' 
dC L + 9 a l _ d c i  M,8) 
.  I arr t  au' ' au' 
d y i  d y i  
Figure 4.2 illustrates country f's peacekeeping contribution curve and its utility max­
imizing contribution level, c*, at which, (4.8) is satisfied. Introducing an assessment 
au' aa' 
effect function shifts the contribution curve up vertically by ^ creates a con-
tribution ceiling, or a kink at the point where the contribution reaches q. The fact that 
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Figure 4.2 Country I's contribution curve (with assessment) 
many countries choose to contribute the exact assessed amounts each year, not even a 
penny more or less, is explained by this kink. 
Although country i is contributing the full Eissessed amount in Figure 4.2, this does 
not always have to be the case. When the vertical shift of the contribution curve is 
relatively small, and/or the assessment is set too large, the country tends to undercon-
at;' 
tribute. Likewise, when is sufficiently large, and/or the assessment is set too small, 
the country is likely to overcontribute. In reality, no member state overcontributes in­
tentionally to special assessment accounts. Instead, some member states make cash or 
in-kind voluntary contributions.^ 
^Since 1973, with an exception of UNFICYP, voluntary contributions in cash toward a peacekeeping 
operation have been used to meet the operation's start-up costs. When assessed contributions sufficient 
for the maintenance or the operation are received, they are repaid to the donor(s). 
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Until 1992, the minirmim contributions made voluntarily by the United Kingdom for 
UNFICYP was $2,109,362 per year (the 1988-89 two-yeax period). After the creation of 
the UNFICYP specizd assessment account, the United Kingdom was cissessed §1,375,141 
in 1994 and $1,325,436 in 1995, and contributed the exact assessed amount by the end 
of each year (See Table 4.5). In other words, the United Kingdom has reduced its annual 
contribution to UNFICYP after the creation of special assessment account. In order to 
explain this reduction, we need to taJce into accoimt the impact on UK contribution of 
aji increase in other countries' contributions. 
Again, returning to the model, let us suppose that increases as the United 
Nations alter the financing method from voluntary contribution to special assessments. 
au' 
With the assimiption of strict quasiconcavity, -§§r must decrease as increases. 
Stfi 
In this ca^e, Ci being smaller than the level of coimtry f's initial voluntary contribution 
is a sufi&cient condition for z's contribution reduction. Figure 4.3 illustrates the case. As 
au' 
Cy increases, the voltmtary contribution curve with the height of -§§r shifts down. 
ay,-
The level of country z's contribution decreases from c„ to c' as the United Nations switch 
the financing method of operation C from voluntary contributions to assessments. 
4.5.2 Model 2 
Given the fact that the United Nations is composed of sovereign nations, improving 
the compliance of its member states to their assessments by imposing tougher penalties 
is rather difficult. According to the contribution model developed above, it is possible 
for the United Nations to increase its member states' contributions simply by increasing 
their assessments. In fact, as Independent Advisory Group on UN Financing (1993) 
reports, "the U.N. Secretariat seems to have overbudgeted for some peacekeeping mis­
sions so that some extra cash is available for other missions, and for the regular budget." 
This can not be a long-term solution for the orgajiization's financial crisis, however. As 
soon as the member states realize the over-budgeting practice by the Secretariat, the 
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Figure 4.3 Country z's contribution curves (with and without assessment) 
assessment effect functions will be affected, and their contributions axe Hkely to decrease. 
As long as the United Nations choose to depend on direct contributions from its 
member states for its financing, it needs to explore the possibilities of improving the 
assessment compliance without depending on tougher penalties nor over-budgeting. One 
tool which the organization is able to use without facing strong opposition, and yet 
might have some impact on each member's contribution incentives is assessment share 
adjustments. The UN peacekeeping assessment scale is based solely on the ability to pay 
of each member state, and not on its valuation of benefits received. For example, under 
the 1996 assessment scale, Japan and Germany were required to finance, respectively 15 
percent and 9 percent of every on-going operation financed through special assessments, 
regardless of the location and nature of the operation. Considering proximity, however, 
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Japan is likely to place greater value on the stability of Asia than that of Eastern Europe, 
while Germany is likely to place greater value on the stability of Ecistem Europe than 
that of Asia. 
Using the contribution model developed above, we now examine the effects on the 
sissessment compliance of adjusting assessment shares across countries for each peace­
keeping operation. Consider two hypothetical UN member states, J and G. Each 
coimtry's utility depends on the level of nation-specific non-peacekeeping activities (y), 
the level of a peacekeeping operation (A), the level of another operation {E), and on 
assessment effect functions for the two operations. The utility function is 
U' = U\yi, A, E, cc\Ai, Ai),e\Ei, E^)), {i = J, G )  (4.9) 
where a' and e' are assessment effect functions associated with operation A and E^ 
respectively. An assessment effect fxinction depends on the country's assessment (A,- for 
a', Ei for e') and its contribution (Ai for a*, Ei for £*). It is increasing in the assessment, 
and decreasing in the contribution. The two operations axe financed by J and G, that 
is, 
Aj + AG = A, (4.10) 
EJ + EG = E. (4.11) 
(4.9) is non-increasing in a' ajid e\ and increasing and strictly concave in t/,-. A, E, 
A,-, ajid Ei- For simplicity, it is assumed that a country never overcontributes. The 
assessments conform to the following assessment rales. 
Aj + Aq = A, (4.12) 
Ej + EG = E, (4.13) 
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A c  +  E o =  (77^) ( A + E ) ,  (4.15) 
where A and E are the total assessments for operation A and E, and Ij and IQ are the 
national income of countries J and (?, respectively. (4.12) and (4.13) indicate that the 
two operations are financed through assessments imposed on coxintries J ajid G. (4.14) 
and (4.15) indicate that each country's total assessment is based on its national income 
share. Notice that it is different from the assessment rule used by the United Nations; 
a coimtry's assessment for each operation does not have to be based on the coimtry's 
income share. A, E, Ij, and IQ are assxmied to be fixed hereafter. 
By differentiating the assessment rules, (4.12), (4.13), (4.14), and (4.15), we obtain 
^ = -1, (4.16) 
S = 
S = -1. H-IS) 
S= 
Additionally, from (4.17) and (4.18), we obtain 
II?- = 1. (4.20) 
o A j  
(4.16), (4.18), and (4.20) are the assessment adjustment rules with respect to Aj. If A j  
is to be increased by one, AQ and Ej need to be reduced by one, while EG needs to be 
increased by one. 
Each coimtry maximizes its utility function, (4.9), subject to its budget constraint, 
Ri = yi + Ai + Ei, (z = J,G) (4.21) 
and its contribution ceilings. A,- > Aj and Ei > Ei. Ri is the revenue of its central 
government. The spillins (Ag and EG for J, Aj and Ej for G) axe held constant at the 
92 
best response levels of the spillin provider. The prices of j/,-, A,- and Ei are assumed to 
be one. The Lagrangian fimction is 
L i  = A, E ,  a'(Ai, A.-),E ^ ) )  + \i[Ri - yi - A.- - Ei] (4.22) 
+A^t[A,- — A,] + y:>i[Ei — Ei] {i = J, G) 
The first-order conditions for i = J, G axe 
dL7 dU'' 
dyi dyi 
~ A- = 0, (4.23) 
S-S'fPS-f—» 
B T '  
^  =  i ? i - y . - - ^ i - E ;  =  0 ,  ( 4 . 2 6 )  
Qf 
= ft(Ai - A") = 0, ft>0, (Ai-A-)>0, (4.27) 
- E:) = 0, ^'i > 0, (Ei - E') > 0. (4.28) 
0(pi 
The effects of assessment adjustments on each country's contributions axe studied 
using a compaxative statics analysis with respect to Aj. From a first-order condition 
(4.23) for coimtry J ajid the assessment adjustment rules with respect to Ay, we obtain 
d y ' j  ( d ^ U - ^ '  d a ' ' \ d A }  d ' U ^ '  
9 y j  d A j  \ d y j d A  d y j d a - ^  d A j )  d A j  d y j d A  d A j  
r d^U-^' d'^U^' dE-j d^U-^' dE^ 
\ d y j d E  ^  d y j d e ^  d E j  J d A j  d y j d E  d A j  
da-'' d'^U^' ds-^' dX} „ 
- = 0. 
dyjda-^ dAj dyjde^ dEj dAj 
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From a first-order condition (4.24) for cotintry J and the assessment adjustment reules 
with respect to Aj, we obtain 
(d^U^ da-'' \  d y j  fd^ d^U^' d^j 
\ d A d y j  d A j  d a - ^ d y j )  d A j  V  d A d a - ^  d A j  )  d A j  
fdU^d^^ da-'' da-'' d^U-'' da-''\ dA'j 
\ da-' dA} dAj da-'dA dAj da-''^ dAj ) dAj 
d^£U^\ dA'a 
V dA^ dAj d a - ' d A ]  d A j  
fd'^U-'- d^U-'' de-'' da-'' d'^U^' da-'' d'^U''' d£-''\ dE} 
[ d A d E  d A d e - ' d E j  d A j  d a - ' d E  d A j  d a - ' d e - '  d E j  )  d A j  
fd'^U^' da-'' d'^U^' \ dE'a 
\ d A d E  d A j  d a - ' d E J  d A j  
f d^U-'' da-''d^U-''\ da-'' _ f da-'' d^U^' \ de-'' 
\dAda-' dAj da-''^ J d A j  d A j  d a -'de-')  d E j  
dU-'' d^a-'' _ ^  ^ ^ Q 
d a - '  d A j d A j  d A j  d A j  
From a first-order condition (4.25) for cotmtry J and the assessment adjustment reules 
with respect to Aj, we obtain 
( d^U^' de-'' d'U-'' \ dy'j 
\ d E d y j  d E j  d e - ' d y j  J  d A j  
fd^U-'' d^U-'' da-'' de-''d^U-'' de-'' d^U-'' da-''\ dA'j 
[ d E d A  d E d a - '  d A j  d E j  d e - ' d A  d E j  d e - ' d a - '  d A j  )  d A j  
fd^U-'' de-''d^U^'\ dA'a (d^U-'' d^U-''de-''\ dE} 
[ d E d A  d e - ' d A  j  a A j  V  9 E ^  d E d e - '  d E j  )  d A j  
f d U ^ '  d ^ e - ' '  d e - ' *  d ' ^ U - ' '  d e - ' '  d ^ U - ' '  d e - ' ' \  d E ' j  
d E j  d e - ' d E  d E j  d e - ' ^  d E j  J  d A j  
fd^U-'' de-'' d^U-'' \ dE^ 
' ^ \ d E ^  d E j  d e - ' d E )  d A j  
f d^U-'' de-'' d^U-'' \ da-'' d^U^' de-'' dU^' d'^e^' 
\ d E d a ^  ^  d E j  d e - ' d a - ' )  d A j  "  d E d e - ' d E j  ~  d e - '  d E j d E j  
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d^J' d2^J' g^J' ^ ^  ^ ^ 
d E j  d e ^ " ^  d E j  d A j  d A j  
From first-order conditions (4.2 6 )-(4.28) for country J and the assessment adjustment 
reules with respect to Aj, we obtain 
(4.32) 
d A j  d A j  d A j  
+ = (4.34) 
From a first-order condition (4.23) for country G  ajid the assessment adjustment riiles 
with respect to A j ,  we obtain 
dy'a d'U^' dA'j f d^U^' d^U^' aa^-\ d A g  .  
d y ^  d A j  d y a d  A  d A  J  ^ ydycdA dyoda^ dAa j dAj 
d^U^* dE'j f d'^U^' d^U^' de^"\ dE^ 
^ d y a d E  d A j  ^  \ d y G d E  d y c d e ^  d E G j d'Aj 
da^' d^U^' de^' dX'c , 
+ -—:r-?^-;r= = 0. 
dyadoP dAc dyade^ dEc dAj 
From a first-order condition (4.24) for country G and the assessment adjustment rules 
with respect to A j ,  we obtain 
(d^U'"' da""' \ dye da""' \ dA'j 
\dAdyG BAg doPdyG) dAj \ dA^ dAG da^dAj dAj ^ ^ 
fd'^U^' da^'\ dA'c 
•*" V aA2 dAda^  dAG J dAj 
f d U ^ '  d ' ^ Q p '  d a ° '  d ^ U ^ '  d a ^ '  d ^ U ^ '  d a ^ ' \ d A g  
d a ^  d A %  d A G  D A ' ^ D A  O A g  d a P " ^  d A c  )  d A j  
dQ°' \ dEj 
\ d A d E  d A G  d a ^ d E )  d A j  
fd^U^' d^U^^ de^" doP' d^U^' da^' d^U^' de^'\ dE^ 
[ d A d E  d A d e ^  d E c  " " "  ~ d A ^ d a < ^ d E  d A c  d a ^ d e ^  d E G  )  d A j  
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_ fd^U^ da^'d^'U^'X da^' f d^U^' do.^' d^U^' \ de^' 
\ d A d a ^  d A c  d o P " ^  j  d ~ A G  ^  \ d A d e ' ^  d A c  d o P d e ' ^ j  d E c  
dU^' d'^a^' dXp dyL'a _ ^ 
da^ dAcdAc dAj dAj 
From a first-order condition (4.25) for country G and the assessment adjustment rules 
with respect to Aj, we obtain 
de^' d''U^-\dyh fd'^U^' de'^'d''U^'\dA'j 
\ d E d y G  d E c  d e ^ d y a )  d A j  ^  \ d E d A  d E c  d e ^ d A )  d A j  ^  ^  
ra^U^' d^U^' de^" d^U^' de^' d^U^' 5a^-\ dA'c 
\MdA dEda^ dAa ^'^de^dA dEo de^da^ dAa J dAj 
f d ^ U ^ '  d e ° '  d ^ U ^ '  \  d E ' j  f  d ^ U ^ '  d ^ U ^ '  d e ^ ' \  d E ^  
d E o  d e ^ d E ) W ] ' ^ [ d E ^  d E d e ^  d E c )  d A j  
fdU^'d'^e^' de^'d'^U^' de^'d'^U^'de^'\ dE'a 
^  V  d e ^  9 E I  d E a  d e ^ d E  d E c  d E c  J  d A j  
f d'^U^' de'^' d^U^' \ da^' d^U^' de^' dU°' d'^e°' 
~ \dEdoP ^ dEo de^da^) dAa dEde^ dEa de^ dEodEa 
dEa QE^ QJ^J QJ^J 
From a first-order condition (4.26)-(4.28) for coimtry G and the assessment adjustment 
rules with respect to Aj, we obtain 
dy'a (4.38) 
d A j  d A j  d A j  
+ (^G — (4.39) 
-V>-a^ + (Ea-E-a}^ + ^ -a = 0. (4.40) 
We axe able to solve (4.29)-(4.40) when we impose the following conditions on the 
assessment effect functions for i = J, G: 
96 
(4.42) 
dAi^Ai aA?'  ^ '  
Ir = "IF, (4-43) 
oEi oEi 
(4.44) 
dEi 
(4.41) aad (4.43) imply that the assessment effect functions are simple peacekeeping 
arrears. That is, 
a' = Ai-Ai, (4.45) 
£'• = Ei - Ei. (4.46) 
for i = J, G. These are the only set of assessment effect functions which satisfies the 
conditions (4.41)-(4.44). 
By solving (4.29)-(4.40) tmder the conditions (4.41)-(4.44), we obtain 
= 0, (4.47) 
o A j  
M = 0, (4.48) 
d A j  
14^ = 1, (4.49) 
d A j  
= -1, (4.50) dA'a 
d A j  
|£ = -1, (4.51) 
o A j  
= 1, (4.S2) 
o A j  
_ Q U 53) 
dAj dAj d~Aj dAj dAj dAj 
See Appendix for the intermediate steps. 
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From (4.49)-(4.52), we obtain 
^  +  g  =  0, ( i  =  J , G )  (4,54) 
These results indicate that the redistribution of assessments across the countries and 
o p e r a t i o n s  h a v e  n o  i m p a c t  o n  e a c h  c o i m t r y ' s  t o t a l  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  ( A '  +  E '  f o r  i  =  J ^ G ) ,  
nor on total contributions to each operation (A} + Aq, E} + EQ), when the conditions 
(4.41)-(4.44) are satisfied. In other words, the United Nations would not be able to 
improve its financial situation by the assessment redistribution. 
(4.45) and (4.46) can be incorporated into a utility function in a variety of ways. For 
example, consider the following utility functions: 
U-" = I/JA-'E^ - p(Aj - Aj + l)'(EJ -EJ + l)^ (4.57) 
= ygA^E^ - p(Ag - Ag + IY{EG - EG + 1)', (4.58) 
w h e r e  ^ > c r > l > / ? > 7 > 7 7 > 0 ,  a n d  p > 0. Notice that country J places greater 
value on operation A than E^ while country G places greater value on operation E than 
A. These utility functions incorporate the assessment effect functions (4.45) and (4.46), 
and also possess all the properties assumed for the utility fimction (4.9). 
As before, each country maximizes its utility subject to its budget constraint (4.21) 
ajid contribution ceilings. A,- > A,- and EI > E{. Suppose RJ = RG = 10,000, /? = 0.97, 
7 = 0.02, 77 = 0.01, 6 = 1.2, a = 1.1, p = 0.5, and initially, Aj = AG = EJ = EG = 
1,000. 
When the first-order conditions for the two countries are solved simultajieously, we 
get AJ = 1,000, EJ = 881.86, AG = 881.86, ajid EG = 1,000. When the assessments 
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axe redistributed as Aj = 1,100, Bj = 900, AG = 900, and EG = 1,100, the levels 
of contributions change to Aj — 1,100, Ej = 781.86, Ac = 781.86, and EG = 1,100. 
As shown by the compaxative statics analysis above, there wotdd be no change in each 
country's total contribution nor total contribution received by each operation. 
This neutrality of assessment redistribution would not be observed once the assess­
ment effect functions assume different forms, however. For example, consider the fol­
lowing utility functions: 
U-" = y^jA'E^ - p + 
e 
U° = vgA''£r -p + Ij +1) ' 
where 0>(t> 1 > / ? > 7 > t7 > O ,  a n d  p > 0. (4.59) and (4.60) possess all the properties 
assumed for the utility function (4.9), and incorporate assessment effect functions 
Ai - Ai a = 
A-
(4.61) 
er' = 
Ei 
which do not satisfy the conditions (4.41)-(4.44) since 
da^ Ai 
dAi 
dot^ 1 
dAi ~ "A.-
de' Ei 
dEi ' E V  
de' 1 
dEi Ei 
(4.63) 
(4.64) 
(4.65) 
(4.66) 
Suppose Rj = RG = 10,000, {3 = 0.97, 7 = 0.02, rj = 0.01, 9 = 1.2, (t = 1.1, p = 750, 
and initially, Aj = Aq = Ej = Eg = 1,000. 
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When the first-order conditions for the two countries axe solved sinmltaneously, we 
get AJ = 1,000, EJ = 434.848, AQ = 434.848, and EQ = 1,000. When the assessments 
axe redistributed as AJ = 1,100, EJ = 900, AC = 900, and EQ = 1,100, the levels 
of contributions change to AJ — 1,100, EJ = 900, AC = 900, and EG = 1,100; each 
country's total contribution and total contribution received by each operation increase 
from 1434.848 to 2000. 
It is interesting to see each coimtry increase its contribution to the operation to which 
it places smaller value as its assessment for the operation decreases . Intuitively, this is 
mainly due to the fact that the absolute value of (jor increases as A,- (^or E^ 
decreases. That is, as fax as the assessment effect functions are concerned, the marginal 
benefit of contribution increzises as the assessment decreases. This, in turn, translates 
into axi increase in the marginal utility of contribution under a certain condition. From 
(4.59), 
yCf p , .  ( A j ~ A j  X  / - E j - E j  V - U i E j - o E A  
d E j d E j -  £ 5  I  A .  M  E j  ^  j  \ 2 E j - E j j -
See Appendix for the intermediate steps. From (4.67), we obtain 
d'^U-' — 
^ < 0  i f f  2 E j > c r E j .  (4.68) 
d E j d E j  
Similarly, from (4.59) and (4.60), we obtain 
d'^U-' — 
^ < 0 i f f  2AJ > 9AJ, (4.69) 
d A j d A j  
dAad'Ao 
< 0 i f f  2AG > CTAG, (4.70) 
< 0 i f f  2EG > 9EG. (4-71) 
SEg^EG 
Since EJ > EJ, AG > AG, AJ > AJ, and EG ^ EG, 
a 2 T T j  ^2rrG 
< 0 and , , <0 if a <2, (4.72) 
d E j d E j  BAGBAG 
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<0 and " <0 ij e< 2 .  (4.73) 
d A j d A j  d E c d E c  
On the other hand, from (4.59) and (4.60), we obtain 
y = {i = J.G) (4.74) 
dyidAi dyidEi 
Therefore, when 6 < 2 (or cr < 2), ceteris paribus, a small decrease in assessment 
shifts the contribution curve up, and the level of contribution is likely to increase if 
the contribution ceiHng is not binding initially.'* On the other hand, if a contribution 
ceiling is binding initially, a small increase in assessment is likely to increase the level of 
contribution, as in the case of AJ and EQ above, even though the contribution curve shifts 
down. As a result, when the assessments are redistributed as above, the contribution to 
each operation by each country could Increase. 
This is illustrated in Figure 4.4. The top diagram shows a case in which the contri­
bution ceiHng is not binding initially (e.g., EJ, AG)- As the assessment decreases, the 
contribution curve shifts up, and the level of contribution, c', increases. The bottom 
diagram, shows a case in which the contribution ceiling is binding initially (e.g.. Ay, 
EG)- AS the assessment increases, the contribution curve shifts down, and the level of 
contribution increases. 
Redistributing the assessment in the opposite way, that is, increasing the assessment 
for a operation with non-binding contribution ceiling and decreasing the assessment for 
a operation with binding contribution ceiling could decrease the level of contribution to 
each operation by each country. 
When 9 (or a) is sufficiently large, ceteris paribus, a decrease in assessment will 
shift the contribution curve down, and decrease the level of contribution. Likewise, an 
increase in assessment will shift the contribution curve up, and increase the level of 
•^Here, we zire focusing on the effects of a change in a country's assessment on its own contribution. 
Other changes, such as the other country's contribution are ignored. 
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Figure 4.4 Assessment Redistribution 
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contribution. The effect of assessment redistribution on the total contribution becomes 
ambiguous in this case. 
Using the utility functions (4.59) and (4.60), Suppose Rj = RG — 10,000, /? = 
0.97, 7 = 0.02, T] = 0.01, 9 = 5.2, a = 4.1, p = 160, and initially, Aj = Ac = 
Ej = EG = 1,000. When the first-order conditions for the two cotintries are solved 
simultaneously, we get Aj = 1,000, Ej = 897.476, AG = 897.476, and EG = 1,000. 
When the assessments are redistributed as Aj = 1,020, Ej = 980, AG = 980, and 
EG = 1,020, the levels of contributions change to Aj = 1,020, Ej = 886.393, AG = 
886.393, aad Bo = 1,020. From (4.68)-(4.71), 50^ > 0, ^0^ > 0, > 0, 
and > 0 in this case. Although each country's total contribution and total 
contribution received by each operation increase from 1897.476 to 1906.393, Ej and Ag 
decreases by 11.083. 
Although there are other possible forms for assessment effect functions, simple arrears 
— At, Ei — and the ratio of arrears to assessment are the most 
reasonable. Given the fact that the United Nations choose to publicize each major 
contributor's arreaxs, rather than its arrears-to-assessment ratio, simple arrears are likely 
to be a better choice for an assessment effect fimction. Put differently, it might be 
possible for the United Nations to influence its member state's assessment effect functions 
to some degree by changing its emphasis, for example, from simple arrears to arrears-
to-assessment ratio. When the assessment effect functions talce the form of arrears-
to-assessment ratio, however, the impact of assessment redistribution depends on the 
specifics of each country's utility function as shown above. 
In the model, it was assimied that there are only two operations financed by just 
two member states. In reality, there are currently 15 on-going operations financed by 
185 coimtries. The gap in the nimaber of contributing countries could be naxrowed when 
only the seven major contributors axe considered for assessment redistribution. The 
assessment shares of the rest could be left untouched. The gap in the number of assess­
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ment accounts could be narrowed if the United Nations reorganizes its special assessment 
accounts into a few regional peacekeeping assessment accounts: Asia account, Europe 
account, etc. Ogata and Volcker of the Independent Advisory Group on UN Financing 
(1993) propose creation of a single unified peacekeeping budget, which include an un­
appropriated margin for new and unexpected operations as well as projections for the 
cost of ongoing operations. The idea of regional peacekeeping accounts falls in between 
the Ogata-Volcker proposal and the current special assessment system. The assessment 
redistribution might be extended to the UN regular budget, also. For example, when 
there axe large operations in Europe, but not in Asia, Japan's regular budget assessment 
share could be increased, while European countries' shares are reduced. 
4.6 Concluding Remarks 
This chapter focused on the effects of UN peacekeeping assessments on member 
states' contributions. The change in the patterns of member states' financial contribu­
tions to UNFICYP after the creation of special assessment account strongly suggests 
that the existence of assessment, although with a very mild penalty for noncompliance, 
can not be ignored when a country's contribution behavior is studied. 
The fact that many countries keep their arrears well below their Article 19 limits 
indicates that losing their General Assembly vote is not the only cost associated with 
imdercontribution. It was argued that the formal responsibilities placed on a member 
state by the assessment system increases the damages the country suffers when it un-
dercontributes. The damages could be associated with the country's status in the global 
commiinity or its relationship with other countries. 
This country-specific damages of undercontribution were incorporated into a utility 
function as assessment effect functions. The introduction of assessment effect functions 
affects a country's contribution by shifting up its contribution curves, and by creating 
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contribution-ceilings. These changes in a country's contribution curves create a the­
oretical possibility of increasing each country's total contribution by redistributing its 
assessments across operations. The last section of this chapter showed that this possibil­
ity exists when the assessment effect functions are not in the form of simple arrears. Due 
to the limitations of computer software used, comparative statics (4.29)-(4.40) could not 
be solved without imposing the conditions (4.41)—(4.44) . Also, the first-order condi­
tions for (4.59) and (4.60) could not be solved for the same reason. In order to study 
the effects of assessment redistribution further, these problems must be overcome. Pax-
ticulaxly the possibility of unintentionally decreasing each coimtry's total contribution 
through assessment-redistribution must be examined. 
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CHAPTER 5 CONCLUSIONS 
In this dissertation, UN peacekeeping was analyzed as a public good. Chapter 2 
examined the change in the ratio of contributor-specific benefits to pure public benefits 
created by UN peacekeeping efforts diiring the period of 1975-96. Based on Olson's 
exploitation hypothesis, burden-shaxing patterns of four different subsets of UN member 
states were studied in order to determine the change in the share of contributor-specific 
benefits. The main findings are simimaxized as following. 
• There is evidence of increased disproportionate burden sharing by wealthy coim-
tries for the NATO sample in the first half of 1990s. This indicates the increased 
share of pure public benefits created by UN peacekeeping, which, in turn, implies 
increased suboptimality of UN peacekeeping efforts during that period. There ap­
pears to be a direct relationship between the size of UN peacekeeping expenditures 
and disproportionate burden sharing. 
• There is no clear evidence of disproportionate burden sharing for other samples, 
which axe composed of coimtries less homogeneous in terms of geographic location 
and political system. The exploitation hypothesis requires the tastes of members 
to be identical. The relative heterogeneity of these saxnples in terms of location 
axid political system shoxild be taken into account when the test results for them 
are studied. 
• As far as non-UN-led peace enforcement operations in the 1990s are concerned, 
the United States and other wealthy countries seem willing to shaire large financial 
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burden. Considering the enormous sizes of these operations, it is clear that the 
findings for UN-led operations imderestimates the disproportionate burden sharing 
for peace operations in the 1990s. 
In Chapter 3, a UN peacekeeping contribution function was derived using a joint-
product approach, and was estimated with the two-stage lezist squaxe method, for each 
of the 25 sample coimtries for the period of 1975-96. The main findings axe summarized 
as following. 
• Peacekeeping contributions of the majority of the sample coimtries react strongly 
axid positively to spiUins. 20 of the 25 sample coimtries show positive and statis­
tically significant spiUin response. 
• Typically a country's peacekeeping contributions reacts very little to its income 
fluctuations. Four of the 25 sample countries show negative and statistically signif­
icant income response, while no countries show positive and significant response, 
• Although some countries' peacekeeping contributions react positively to their trade-
ratio fluctuations, majority (17) of the 25 sample countries show insignificant trade-
ratio response. 
The first two of the above results axe quite different from the ones found in military 
alliance studies. The following are considered to be the rationale for the differences. 
• UN peacekeeping is financed by assessments, while military build-up of allied coun­
tries are not. 
• The shaxe of national income devoted to peacekeeping by each country is tiny, 
compared to the shaxe devoted to national defense. 
• Peacekeeping often requires quick response to the changing nature of a conflict. In 
this sense, peacekeeping is more comparable to fighting small-scale waxs axound 
the globe thaxi peacetime militaxy build-up of allied countries. 
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Chapter 4 analyzed the effects of special assessment system on UN member states' 
peacekeeping contributions. Member states' actual contribution patterns under the as­
sessment system were examined, and a theoretical model which explains those patterns 
was developed. The possibility of increasing each member state's total contribution 
by redistributing its assessments across peacekeeping operations was also studied. The 
main points of the chapter axe stmmiarized as following. 
• The formal responsibilities placed on a country by the cissessment system increases 
the damages the country suffers when it undercontributes. The damages could be 
associated with the coimtry's status in the global commxmity or its relationship 
with other countries. 
• The assessment system shifts up a country's contribution curve, and creates contribution-
ceiling, beyond which the coimtry is unlikely to contribute. 
• Assuming that undercontributor-specific damages received by each coxmtry are 
a function of finajicial hardship imposed on the United Nations by the country, 
rather thaji a function of percentage of its finajicial responsibility unfulfilled, it 
is theoretically impossible for the United Nations to increase each country's total 
contribution by redistributing its assessments across operations. 
As discussed in Chapter 3, for a peacekeeping operation to be successful, it reqmres 
rapid deployment of adequately equipped personnel to the conflict area, which is often 
infeasible due to slow ajid inadequate responses of member states to the UN requests. 
To deal with the problem, the United Nations has created the Stajid-by Arrajigements 
system in 1994. Under this system, participating UN member states are expected to 
provide resources necessary for peacekeeping upon requests from the Secretary Gen­
eral, within an agreed response time. The nimiber of countries which indicated their 
willingness to participate in the system has now reached 85. 
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As implied by the large number, however, under the current agreement, the partic­
ipating member states retain the right to refuse a request for contributing to a specific 
mission. In 1994, for example, when the mandate of UNAMIR WELS extended, none of 
the 19 countries participating in the arrangements at that time agreed to contribute 
their forces (Hill and Malik 1996).^ 
If the United Nations is to play a significant role in future large-scale peacekeeping 
operations, it would need to create and maintain its own adequately equipped and 
trained stand-by forces with necessary power-projecting capacity. This would not be 
possible imless the organization acqxiires more stable and substantial revenue sources 
than the current assessment system. There have been a number of studies on alternative 
financing of peacekeeping and other UN activities recently. Many of them are based on 
global taxes imposed on negative externalities such as carbon combustion emissions, 
and fees imposed on global commons such as the deep ocean bed.^ Given the potential 
benefits and risks of the United Nations with automaticity, or automatic inflow of funds, 
the study on various alternative financing methods should be continued further, and it 
would be the next research topic of the author. 
^Given this eind other limitations of the Stand-by Arrangement System, in 1996, Austria, Canada, 
Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, and Sweden agreed to support the establishment of Multi­
national UN Stand-by Forces High Readiness Brigzule (SHIRBRIG), which now edso includes Argentina, 
Portugal, Romania, eind Spain. For details, visit SHIRBRIG Internet site, http://ftp.shirbrig.dk/. 
^Mendez (1992) discusses a number of other global taxes and fees proposed at the UN fora. The 
discussions of global tzixes and fees have not been taking place at the UN fora since 1997, however, due 
to strong opposition by the United States, whose voluntary contributions to the UN agencies are now 
conditional upon the orgzinization not engaged in einy effort to implement or impose any taxation on 
United States persons in order to raise revenue for the United Nations or any of its specialized agencies. 
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APPENDIX 
Chapter 4: Comparative statics results (4.47)—(4.53) — inter­
mediate steps 
Assuming (4.41)-(4.44) allows us to rearraiige (4.29)—(4.40) as following. From 
(4.29), we obtain 
d-'V' d^j d^U'- fdA} dA^\ da-"' fdA} \ 
d A j  d y j d A  \ d A j  d A j  J dyjda-' dAj ) 
(dE'j /ag} >1 d^j _ 
d y j d E  \ d A j  d A j )  d y j d e - ' d E j  \ d A j  )  d A j  
From (4.30), we obtain 
\ d A d y j  d A j  d o c ^ d y j )  d A j  
da-^'\ fdA'j 
V" a A ^  d A d c c - '  d A j  J  J X J )  
f  d U - ^ ' d a - ' '  d ^ U - ^ '  d a - ' d ^ U ^ ' d a ' ' \  ( d A }  \  
^ Vaa-^" dA} dAj doc^dA dAj da-'^ dAj) V^Aj ) 
da-'' d^U^' \ fdE'j dE^\ 
[ d A d E  d A j  d a - ' d E j  d A j  J  
fd'^U-'- de^' da-'' d'^U^' de^*\ fdE'j \ 
\dAde'' dEj dAj da-'de-' dEj J ^ / 
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From (4.31), we obtain 
\ d E d y j  d E j d e J d y j )  d A j  
de^'d'^U^'\ fdAj 
\ d E d A  d E j  d e ^ d A j  V 5 A j  d A j  )  
f d^U-'' dcx-^' de-'" da-^'\ (dA'j \ 
\dEda-' dAj dEj de^da-^ dAj ) V^Aj J 
fd^U-^' ^QE'j dEG\ 
d E ^  d E d e J  d E j )  Uaj d A j  )  
f d U ^ ' d H - ^ '  d e - ^ ' d ^ U - ^ '  d e - ^ ' d ^ U - ^ ' d e - ^ ' \  f d E }  \  
V  9 e - ^  d E j  d E j  d e - ^ d E  d E j  d e - ^ ' ^  d E j )  V ^ A j  J  
d^j d<p} _ ^ 
d A j  d A j  
From (4.32)-4.34), we obtain 
From (4.35), we obtain 
d y h  d'U^' (dA'j d'U^' dcP fd^a N 
dye dAj dyadAydAj dAj) dyoda^ dAaXdAj j 
d^U^' fd E ' j  d E ^ \ d'^U^" de^ fd E ^  _ i) _ = 0 
^  d y a d E  V , ^ A j  d A j  J  d y a d e ^  d E c  V ^ A j  }  d A j  
From (4.36), we obtain 
(d^U^ ^ g. 
\dAdyG dAc da^dyo J dAj 
fd'^U^' da^' d^U^' \ fdA-j dA^\ 
V 5A2 dAa doPdA) V^Aj dAj) 
Ill  
fdU^'d^a^' doP' da^'d'^U^'do^'\ fdA'c " 
[ da^ dAl ^ dAa da^dA dAo doP"^ dAo J \dAj , 
doP' d^U^' \ fdE'j dE^\ 
\ d A d E  ^  d A c  d a ^ d E )  d A j )  
r d ^ U ^ ' d e ^ '  d a ^ '  d ^ ' U ^ '  d e ^ - \  [ d E ^ ,  
ydAde'^ dEo dAc doPde^ dEa ) V5i4j =^ -1  
_ Q 
d A j  d A j  
From (4.37), we obtain 
(A.9) 
V  d E d y c  d E o  d e ^ d y a  J  d A j  ^  '  
(d^U^' deP' \ (dA'j dA'^^ 
[ d E d A  d E o  d e ^ d A J  V ^ A j  d A j )  
( dcP de^ d'^U^' fdA'a \ 
[ d E d a ^  d A a  d E a  d e ^ d a ^  d A a  )  [ d A j J  
f d ^ U ^ '  d e ^ '  d ^ U ^ '  \  ( d E ' j  a E ' G \  
V aE2 dEo de^dE J V^Aj dAj) 
f d U ^ ' d ^ e ^ '  d e ^ ' d ^ U ^ '  d z ^ ' d ' ^ U ^ *  d e ^ ' \  ( d E ' a  \  
V dEa de^dE dEa de^-^ dEa j Uaj )  
_ Q 
d A j  d A j  
From (4.38)-(4.40), we obtain 
£^ + ^  + ^  = 0, (A.IO) 
d A j  ^  d A j  ^  d A j  '  
It is fairly easy to see that the above 12 equations can be solved simultaneously to 
get (4.47)-(4.53). A computer-aided calculation confirms that the solution is unique. 
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Chapter 4: Equation (4.67) — intermediate steps 
From. (4.59), we obtain 
8 /T=r T-i \ cr—1 
d'U-' pc- (A j - A j  ,  ( E j - E j  ,  , V  '  
d E j d E j  e ' j K  A J ) \ Ej '*' ) 
6 /-FT „ \ <r-2 
-  P < ^  ( A J - A J  y  f E j - E J  y-W {a- D E /  
E'JK AJ ^ ) [ EJ ^ J V 2EJ-EJ^ 
pa f Aj — Aj f EJ — EJ \^ f 2EJ — AEJ\ 
E 
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